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Preface 
 
The primary interest of sociological studies lies in the investigation of human 
interactions embedded in social structures and institutions. Based upon this premise, this 
dissertation aims to examine how various aspects of human well-being are affected by a 
wholesale institutional shift toward a free-market economic regime from a dirigiste 
developmental framework. In particular, drawing on the decadal experience of South 
Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), I study the impact of the so-called 
neoliberal socioeconomic restructuring on the welfare of the general public by exploring 
how associations between important measures of personal well-being (e.g. education-
earnings) have changed along with the intensification of the new political economy after 
the AFC. Focusing on the socioeconomic consequences of the neoliberal transition that 
occurred at the particular historical juncture of the Korean capitalist development, the 
implications of the epochal institutional shift for individual well-being are to be examined 
in light of the sociological promise.    
Neoliberalism, a short-hand of neoclassical liberalism, is an ideology, philosophy 
of political economy, and a mode of governance in the capitalist economy that believes in 
the supremacy of free-market mechanisms for the distribution of all sorts of goods and 
services. Initially introduced in the U.S. and the U.K. as a set of the supply-side policy 
solutions to the problems of the stagflation in the 1970s, neoliberalism and the 
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socioeconomic restructuring based on its tenets aim to improve efficiency and 
profitability across the board through market forces free of external interventions, 
particularly from the state. Accordingly, its primary tenets include deregulation from the 
state, privatization of the public enterprise, and liberalization of the trade, all of which 
amount to a complete departure from the ideas and practices of the managed capitalism in 
the post-war period up to the 1970s. Although it began as a minor ideational social 
experiment within major capitalist countries at first, ever since the neoliberal capitalist 
accumulation gained its ideological and practical primacy in the domain of policy making, 
academia, and the international financial institutions, the neoliberal practice has become 
widespread across the globe over the last three decades, still being the dominant mode of 
capitalist developmental regime even at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  
South Korea, once praised as an exemplar of the state-led economic development 
in the aftermath of the Korean War, also began to adopt the logic and practice of 
neoliberalism since the early 1980s. Due to the legacy of the strong developmental state 
and the geopolitical peculiarities of South Korea, however, the substantial 
implementation of the neoliberal practice had not been initiated until the early 1990s, and 
only after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, began the full range of the neoliberal 
restructuring by influential domestic and international policy makers taking advantage of 
the crisis situation. Although the onset of the neoliberal transformation was relatively 
slow and late in South Korea compared to other industrial countries, its progression 
afterwards has not: With the comprehensive neoliberal structural adjustment and 
regulatory reforms over the last decade or so, the government, corporate, financial, and 
labor sectors of South Korea have been thoroughly reengineered in the short period of 
vi 
 
time and become qualitatively different socioeconomic entity that fits best to the current 
mode of neoliberal globalization.  
As of 2011, South Korea has successfully become a neoliberal economy by any 
global standards and fully integrated into the global market with a steady economic 
growth since the epochal event in 1997. However, the social costs of the fundamental 
socioeconomic restructuring toward the new political economy have been as much drastic 
as the speed and magnitude of the transition: With the dissipating government support 
and institutional regulations in favor of free-market operation, the level of inequality, 
poverty, and insecurity in post-crisis South Korea has substantially increased to the 
unprecedented level while the benefits of the global integration and the post-crisis 
economic growth have not been shared equally across social strata. As with other 
countries who adopted the neoliberal practice before South Korea, the rising economic 
tide over the post-crisis period did not lift all boats but the select few, and this further 
confirmed that increasing inequality and insecurity is the rule rather than the exception 
under the neoliberal developmental regime.  
Against this context, I study the decadal experience of South Korea after the 
1997 AFC in order to examine the long-term impacts of the crisis and the concurrent 
neoliberal restructuring on the welfare of the general public, particularly focusing on its 
social consequences for various aspects of personal well-being. Utilizing the Korean 
Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and diverse statistical methods for tracing the 
changes, the trajectories of both the material and subjective measures of personal well-
being (e.g. income, consumption, and life satisfaction) are studied in relation to principal 
socioeconomic factors (e.g. education, family wealth, and marital status respectively) 
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under the general trend of increasing inequality and polarization after the AFC. In this 
attempt to investigate the socio-demographic mechanisms through which the impact of 
the post-crisis neoliberal restructuring on personal well-being has been mediated or 
moderated, not only do I emphasize the significance of institutional forces in shaping 
human interactions but also seek viable options for sustainable socioeconomic 
development in the twenty-first century through the reinterpretation of the experiences of 
South Korea in light of the global political economy. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
SOCIOECONOMIC POLARIZATION AND PERSONAL WELL-BEING UNDER 
NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING: IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA 
AFTER THE 1997 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
by 
 
Sun Jae Hwang 
 
 
Chair: Yu Xie  
 
 
Over the last three decades, the world has witnessed another fundamental 
institutional shift in the history of capitalist development. In the wake of the series of 
economic crises in the 1970s, the so-called neoliberalism and socioeconomic 
restructuring based on its tenets arose as a solution to the problems of stagflation and 
quickly spread across the globe thanks to its ideational and practical appeals. South Korea 
has not been an exception to the worldwide current of the neoliberal globalization and 
pursued the neoliberal restructuring since the early 1980s, but particularly actively after 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As a consequence of the comprehensive neoliberal 
structural adjustment based on free-market mechanisms, however, South Korea has 
 xii 
 
experienced a substantial increase in inequality, poverty, and insecurity over the last 
decade or so. Against this context, I examine both the material and subjective aspects of 
personal well-being in order to seek the implications of the post-crisis neoliberal 
restructuring for the general welfare of the Korean society in particular, and other 
neoliberal countries in general. In the first substantive chapter, the association between 
education and rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea is studied to measure 
how much of the increase in the post-crisis earnings inequality is due to diverging 
earnings returns to education. Second, the relationship between family wealth and 
household consumption is examined over the course of economic crisis and recovery in 
post-crisis South Korea, and I further investigate if possession of family wealth has a 
buffering effect on the level of household consumption over economic crisis. Lastly, the 
association between marital status and the level of life satisfaction is studied at the time 
of economic crisis as well as during the subsequent period of economic recovery. By 
examining the subjective aspect of personal well-being in relation to marital status in 
post- crisis South Korea, I evaluate if the “marriage premium” still holds positive even in 
the period of severe economic hardships. Based on these theoretical and empirical 
observations, I discuss in the concluding section a more viable form of capitalist 
development for the twenty-first century than the current neoliberal mode of 
globalization.   
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Political Economy of Development of South Korea  
over the Last Five Decades 
 
 
The impact of economic crisis on one’s welfare is not proportionate: Those who 
possess substantial socioeconomic resources (e.g. income and wealth) at the time of the 
crisis are better protected from the vagaries of the challenging economic conditions, and 
the probability of survival and post-crisis prosperity is also highly contingent on the pre-
existing individual circumstances.1 In addition, subsequent opportunity structures during 
an ensuing recovery period are also unevenly distributed according to one’s economic 
durability at the time of the hardships, which is once again largely defined by the amount 
of socioeconomic resources that individuals can draw over the course of economic crisis.  
This unequal nature of economic crisis, however, is not only a function of 
differential individual circumstances but also of preexisting social structures and 
institutions. Depending on the type of economic regime that a country pursues as a whole, 
for instance, the extent to which individual members of the society experience the crisis 
situation – or socioeconomic difficulties in general – greatly varies even for those 
possessing the same level of individual resources. In particular, the disproportionate 
                                           
1 As also implied in the Korean and Chinese word of ‘crisis’ (위기 and 危機 respectively), the crisis 
situation is considered as a crisis(危)-cum-an opportunity(機) for different social groups of people. 
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impact of economic crisis over individuals can be substantially moderated by proactive 
government interventions and policies temporarily protecting them from the external 
shock: If the government, for example, promptly implements expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies at the time of the recession, some unfavorable individual circumstances 
can be effectively ameliorated by those favorable institutional measures, and vice versa. 
Even if the implementation of the active governmental interventions is not always 
feasible or desirable, depending on the causes and conditions of the crisis, it cannot be 
denied that the disproportionate impact of economic crisis on one’s welfare is 
substantially delineated by the socioeconomic policies and institutional settings, and the 
government, as a holder of the largest socioeconomic resources of the society, could 
effectively function as the last resort. 
However, what if the government and society in general are unable to provide 
such public provisions during the extended period of economic crisis? In addition, taking 
advantage of the crisis situation, what if external institutions force the government to 
carry out at least temporarily malignant socioeconomic policies whose long-term societal 
consequences are not warranted positive either? To make matters worse, if the 
government and other influential sectors of the society are also ready, if not eager, to join 
the venture of “less government, more free market” when indeed more government 
support and regulations are needed, what would happen to those people already hit hard 
by economic crisis itself? 
Whether intended or not, this was the situation that South Korea and some other 
East and Southeast Asian countries – notably Thailand and Indonesia – had to confront 
when their economies were severely debilitated by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (the 
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AFC hereafter). Having begun with the asset bubble burst in Thailand over the summer 
of 1997, the AFC rapidly spread to the rest of Southeast and East Asian countries by the 
end of the same year. Despite huge debates on the nature and causes of the AFC, the 
proximate causes of the economic crisis can be summarized as the unfortunate 
combination of 1) the downturn of the domestic economy before the crisis, 2) the swift 
and huge exodus of foreign capital from financial sectors, and 3) the premature and 
aggressive capital account liberalization that further exacerbated the vulnerability of the 
affected economies in the era of global financial system (Krugman 2009b; Sachs and 
Woo 2000; Stiglitz 2003; Wade 1998a; Woo 2007a). This sudden capital flight and the 
concomitant loss of foreign “investors’ confidence” in the crisis-stricken economies 
immediately incapacitated both stock markets and foreign exchange rates, and in the end, 
the hard-hit countries, such as South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, had to seek foreign 
assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)2 in order to avoid total 
economic collapse derived from the financial meltdown. In case of South Korea, the 
government asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bailouts in November 1997 
when its economy was already deep into trouble, and the IMF ‘rescue package’ of then 
recode-high 57 billion dollars was signed in the following month after protracted 
negotiations between the IMF and the government (IMF 1997). 
In exchange for the financial assistance arranged by the IMF, however, the debtor 
nations had to accept the aforementioned ironic socioeconomic policies as a necessary 
condition for the bailout and were required to implement the so-called ‘neoliberal 
structural adjustment programs’ designed by the IMF and other International Financial 
                                           
2 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are the major international financial institutions. 
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Institutions during the contract period.3 Although the effectiveness of the application of 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ neoliberal program based on the market fundamentalism to the AFC 
situation was doubted by many professionals at the time4, the IMF administered the 
promised bailout package to the country only when the ‘progress’ was made in terms of 
the implementation of the conditionality. Moreover, in some recipient countries – notably 
South Korea – there existed a group of reform-minded elites who were more than willing 
to embrace the wide-raging structural adjustment and regulatory reforms suggested by the 
IMF even if a substantial amount of social costs was expected to incur when the program 
was implemented at the time of the national crisis. Regardless, the neoliberal 
transformation project for market efficiency and global competitiveness significantly 
began to take shape in these former dirigiste Asian economies as a joint venture of the 
influential domestic and international agents taking advantage of the crisis situation. 
In the immediate wake of the AFC, however, the real economy of each country 
fell into a serious downward spiral of recession primarily due to the orthodox neoliberal 
policies – Raising interest rates to stem the outflow of capital and cutting budgetary 
                                           
3 The structural adjustment program recommended by the IMF at the time consisted of two sets of policy 
measures; first, as an immediate measure to recover ‘investor’s confidence’ right after the crisis, the 
program called on crisis-struck nations to cut back on government spending to reduce deficits, 
allow insolvent banks and financial institutions to fail, and aggressively raise interest rates based on the 
reasoning that these steps would restore confidence in the nations' fiscal solvency, penalize insolvent 
companies, and protect currency values. Secondly, as a measure for longer-term economic restructuring 
aligned with the logic of neoliberalism, the debtor nations were required to implement a set of 
socioeconomic policies that emphasize more of the role of free-market mechanisms vis-à-vis the state 
intervention in the distribution of goods and services. 
 
4 Critics noted the contradictory nature of these policies, arguing that in a recession, the traditional 
Keynesian response was to increase government spending, prop up major companies, and lower interest 
rates. The reasoning was that by stimulating the economy and staving off recession, governments could 
restore confidence while preventing economic loss. They pointed out that the U.S. government had pursued 
expansionary policies, such as lowering interest rates, increasing government spending, and cutting taxes, 
when the United States itself entered a recession in 2001, and arguably the same in the fiscal and monetary 
policies during the recent Great Recession. 
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outlay to rebuild confidence in their finances at the time of economic crisis generated a 
tremendous amount of bankruptcies, unemployment, and social unrest. In South Korea, 
for instance, more than 10,000 firms went into bankruptcy in the following three months, 
an unemployment rate tripled in a year, and a suicide rate reached the highest level 
among the OECD member nations.5 With ‘artificial’ government interventions and 
regulations restricted by the IMF agreement and by the government’s own will to a 
substantial extent, the disproportionate impact of the economic crisis hastened to unveil 
its naked nature, thrusting most vulnerable individuals in these countries into the double 
jeopardy of economic crisis on the one hand and the dissipating institutional supports on 
the other. As a result of this inopportune combination of economic crisis and the 
simultaneous implementation of free-market structural reforms, the event that had started 
as an exchange rate disaster or an external liquidity crisis became a full-fledged economic 
crisis with serious social consequences, making the experience of the AFC a regional 
equivalent of the Great Depression at the end of the twentieth century (Stiglitz 2003; 
Wade 1998a). 
As of 2011, more than a decade of time has passed since the worst economic 
recession ever experienced by the Asian continent. Even if a decade or so may not be a 
long enough time to conclusively assess the implications and consequences of the AFC 
and the accompanied neoliberal restructuring, it is definitely the moment to critically 
evaluate the intended and unintended consequences of the epochal event in the modern 
capitalist history, especially when the entire world is suffering from another global 
financial crisis resembling the AFC in some respects. In addition, by shedding new light 
                                           
5 Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/) and World Health Organization (http://www.who.int/) 
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on the various consequences of the recent large-scale economic recession before the 
current global financial crisis, not only do we expect to derive lessons from the past in 
order not to make the undesirable history repeat itself but also to have an opportunity to 
reconsider the systematic nature of economic crisis under the contemporary financial 
capitalism. Moreover, utilizing the passage of time as another critical tool of analysis, we 
can also evaluate the long-term consequences of the crisis vis-à-vis its immediate impacts 
on the general welfare of the individuals in the crisis-afflicted countries. Unlike the 
economic and political aspects of the crisis, studies on its long-term social impacts and 
broad implications for social stratification and inequality have been rather sparse in the 
existing literature (Chu and Hill 2001; Pirie 2008; Van Hoa 2000). Considering that social 
consequences and stuructural changes derived from economic crisis often times do not 
fully fledge until the immediate impact of crisis abates, discussion on the social 
ramifications of the crisis at this moment – in conjunction with those of the economic and 
political changes for the last decade – seems more than timly ever. 
In this regard, I study the decadal experience of South Korea after the 1997 AFC 
in order to examine the long-term consequences of the crisis and simultaneous neoliberal 
reforms, focusing on their impacts on personal well-being. In particular, I investigate the 
patterns and trajectories of increasing socioeconomic inequality and polarization in post-
crisis South Korea in relation to both material and subjective measures of personal well-
being, such as income, consumption, and the level of life satisfaction.6 In addition, 
because it has already been well proven in other early adopters of neoliberalism (e.g. the 
U.S. and the U.K. since the late 1970s) that one of the most visible social consequences 
                                           
6 Although the three measures are far from exhaustive to cover the wide range of personal well-being, the 
chain of ‘income-consumption-subjective level of life satisfaction’ is believed to comprise substantial areas 
of one’s well-being in the contemporary capitalist society. 
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of neoliberal reforms has been a massive increase in income inequality and the 
concentration of wealth (Krugman 2009a; Levy and Temin 2007; Piketty and Saez 2003; 
Wolff 2002), I additionally investigate various social mechanisms or intervening 
processes of the increasing inequality and polarization, using South Korea as another case 
that has undergone the qualitative socioeconomic transition most recently. 
On the basis of various national statistics and nationally representative 
longitudinal panel data, three core research questions are to be addressed throughout this 
study: 1) For the last decade or so, has South Korea shown a similar pattern of increasing 
socioeconomic inequality and polarization as in the other early neoliberal countries? 2) If 
so, what are the intervening socioeconomic mechanisms through which the impact of the 
inequality and polarization on diverse personal well-being measures has been mediated or 
moderated? To be more specific, did the major socio-demographic factors such as one’s 
level of education, family wealth, and marital status play a crucial role in the mediation 
or moderation of the disproportionate impact of the economic crisis and the restructuring 
processes? 3) Lastly, what are the long-term social consequences of the neoliberal 
restructuring and the concomitant market liberalization measures that occurred amid the 
worst economic recession of the country? Does it also have any implications for the study 
of social stratification and inequality in the current mode of globalization? Focusing on 
these three major questions, the decadal experience of South Korea after the AFC is to be 
analyzed under the general theoretical framework of the global political economy. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first deliberate in detail the 
domestic and international circumstances in which South Korea was situated at the brink 
of the AFC in 1997. Next, I analyze the social consequences of the AFC, paying 
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particular attention to the increasing level of inequality and polarization during the post-
crisis period. In the following section, the longitudinal panel data and analytic methods 
employed for this research are briefly discussed. Lastly, the summaries of three empirical 
studies included in this thesis are presented as an anchoring point for further discussion in 
later chapters. 
 
The Miracle, the 1997 Crisis, and the Neoliberal Turn of South Korea  
 
The Miracle 
 
After the Korean War in the early 1950s, what had brought South Korea back to 
the international spotlight was its unprecedented level of economic development in the 
aftermath of the war. In 1961, South Korea was one of the 25 poorest countries in the 
world with $82 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (in 1961 prices), which was 
less than a half of Ghana’s at the time (Chang 2008). In addition, most industrial bases 
after the 1945 Liberation from the Japanese colonial rule were either located in the North 
or mostly destroyed over the Korean War. Considering all the geopolitical and economic 
adversities that South Korea had to face in the early 1960s, therefore, it may have been 
more than apposite for United States policymakers to assess the country as a ‘hopeless 
case’ for any kind of development (Hart-Landsberg 1993).  
The socioeconomic trajectory that South Korea painstakingly devised for the 
next four decades, however, could have not been more than opposite to the prediction. 
Averaging 8% of annual economic growth for about three successive decades until the 
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early 1990s, South Korea remarkably transformed itself from the hopeless case with tiny 
national income to one of the exemplars of the newly industrializing countries with 
approximately $11,000 GDP per capita in 1996. At the end of the same year, South Korea 
proudly knocked on the door of world’s richest countries club, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and became the 29th member of the 
organization, epitomizing its remarkable economic success in just one generation. Over 
the relatively short period of time, South Korea indeed narrated one of the most 
successful stories in the history of capitalistic development and became widely known as 
the ‘East Asian Miracle’ in general, and the ‘Miracle of Han River’7 in particular (World 
Bank 1993). 
In the process of making the miracle from the early 1960s to early 1990s, 
however, South Korea, as a ‘late developer’ of modern capitalism, had to devise and 
apply a unique recipe for economic development distinctive from conventional Anglo-
American models (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Lie 1998). At the beginning of the 
developmental stage in the aftermath of the Korean War, South Korea was completely 
devoid of any substantial capital or technology, thus any resources leftover for economic 
developmet had to be effectively mobilized and allocated under centralized plans. In 
addition, because economic growth in Korea had been primarily directed by the colonial 
state during the Japanese Colonial Rule (1910 – 1945), and economic activity was 
dominated by a few large Japanese firms, the Japanese-initiated process of 
industrialization did little to strengthen the power or position of Korean capitalists. 
Instead, Japanese colonialism left Korea with a strong centralized state apparatus and 
                                           
7 The major river that runs through Seoul, the capital of South Korea 
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weak capitalist class (Hart-Landsberg 1993; Pirie 2008; Woo 1991). As a consequence, 
the state rather than private enterprise took the lead in organizing developmental plans 
under the decades-long military rule (1961-1987), and subsequent economic development 
was also predicated on this authoritarian dirigiste state reigning over all other societal 
sectors, such as business, finance, and labor (Gerschenkron 1962). Moreover, during the 
Cold War, due to the geopolitical significance of South Korea as a democratic capitalist 
bulwark against the communist bloc in East Asia, massive foreign aids, particularly from 
the U.S., also significantly contributed to the enhancement of the state as the major 
distributional channel of the financial goods (Cumings 1999).  
Since it is the state that could monopolize the major financial flows under this 
configuration of development, the Korean state under the military dictatorship was not 
reluctant to exploit this ‘positional good’ with regard to nurturing, disciplining, and 
cajoling the business sector at its own will for economic development. Based on the tight 
control over the allocation of international borrowing and domestic savings, the so-called 
‘Korean developmental state’ was not only able to solidify the nexus between the state, 
bank, and business for successive economic development, but also capable of carefully 
and actively directing industrial transformations according to the global changes (Evans 
1995; Hart-Landsberg 1993; Lie 1998; Woo-Cumings 1999; Woo 1991). Along with high 
domestic savings rate and heavy government investment in education, the state-centered 
industrialization strategy effectively served to make South Korea an economic 
powerhouse at the end of the twentieth century, and the phenomenal economic growth 
and state policies rendered possible a unique combination of improvement in the standard 
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of living with relatively equitable income distributions for millions of Korean people.8 
 
The 1997 Economic Crisis 
 
In no less than a year after joining the OECD, however, the seemingly 
unstoppable developmental engine of South Korea came to an abrupt halt by the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Starting from the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, 
the AFC swiftly spread to the rest of East and Southeast Asian countries by the end of 
same year, and South Korea was also not able to escape from the contagious effect of the 
AFC. Even if then the managing director of the IMF commented that the financial 
conditions and fundamentals of South Korea were not as critical as other crisis-affected 
Southeast Asian countries, thus the confidence level about Korean market soon to be 
recovered, the formidable contagious effect of the ‘financial flu’ did not stop at the 
adjacent neighbors of the epicenter but reached to the Far East Asian countries, finally 
debilitating the financial market of South Korea in November 1997.9 Considering the 
speed and magnitude of Asia’s collective stumble between 1997 and 1998, it is no 
exaggeration to argue that the erosion of the wealth and the increases in poverty and 
social insecurity were the regional equivalent of the Great Depression in the 1930s (Asian 
Development Bank 1999a; Wade 1998a). 
Debates over the causes of the financial crisis in general – and South Korea in 
                                           
8 The social and human cost of the authoritarian state-centered economic development, of course, was as 
much enormous as the economic gains. 
 
9 Due to the sudden foreign capital flight at the beginning of the crisis, the Korean stock market lost more 
than 50% of its value along with the similar level of currency devaluation against the U.S. dollar by the end 
of 1997. 
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particular – have been as much diverse as the controversiality of the crisis itself (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett 2001; Pempel 1999; Wade and Veneroso 1998); but they can be 
classified into three broad categories: the group of experts who blame 1) the internal 
contradictions of the very Korean developmental model facing the new era of 
globalization, 2) the external volatility of the unfettered global financial capital, and 3) 
the untimely and unfortunate combination of both.  
The first group of experts argues that the developmental state model that South 
Korea had effectively utilized until the 1997 crisis became out of date and unsustainable 
in the era of globalization. Since the state-centered dirigiste economy can neither be as 
efficient nor flexible as that managed by private business sectors in today’s globalized 
free market, the outbreak of the 1997 crisis was nothing but the proof of the failure of 
South Korea’s anachronistic reliance on the old model that needs an overhaul for future 
development. According to this view, the inefficient allocation of resources based on the 
secretive and corruptive relationship between the state, business, and bank was the major 
cause of the collapse during the AFC, sometimes denounced as ‘crony capitalism’ 
(Hughes 1999; Shin and Chang 2003). Due to the collusive relationship, the moral hazard 
among the business and financial sectors prevailed and the unsustainable level of debt 
that they had accrued up to the crisis finally hastened the bankruptcy of the ‘Korea Inc.’ 
(Wade 1998b). 
On the contrary, the second group of scholars argues that even if the Korean 
developmental state model had its own problems of corruption and inefficiency due to the 
collusive state-bank-business relationship, South Korea could have passed the economic 
turmoil without such severity if the flow of international financial capital had been in 
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control of the government so that the massive amount of worldwide speculative and 
hedge funds were not able to take advantage of the 1997 crisis situation to capture huge 
profits (Winters 1999). In this perspective, the culprit of the financial crisis was not 
necessarily the Korean developmental model itself, which particularly had shown a 
decent and stable development record up to the crisis, but the volatility of the overly 
deregulated international financial market, in which the massive movement of profit-
seeking financial capital is easily made within the seconds of mouse-clicks without much 
domestic and/or international regulations (Johnson 1998; Wade 1998a; Wade 1998c).10 In 
this respect, the premature financial market opening of South Korea in the early 1990s in 
the expectation of the membership of the OECD only aggravated the vulnerability of the 
economy to the danger of the global financial capital (Chang, Park, and Yoo 1998). 
Lastly, the third perspective attempts to make sense of both the internal and 
external circumstances of South Korea in the early 1990s when the increasing level of 
globalization and worldwide competition rendered the state-centered development 
strategy unsustainable and the accelerated international and domestic market 
liberalization unavoidable at the end of the twentieth century. According to this view, the 
cause of the crisis for the Korean case is defined as a ‘transition failure’ rather than the 
developmental-state failure, in which the harsh outcomes of the Asian Financial Crisis 
were the joint product of the external shock, internal weakness, policy mistakes, and the 
vulnerability of Korean economy in the ‘confidence-attainment game’ of the global 
financial system (Chang 2006; Sachs and Woo 2000; Shin and Chang 2003). Thus if the 
government and other sectors of society had carefully devised new developmental 
                                           
10 This factor also contributed to the significant part of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
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schemes before hastily discarding the ‘old’ state-centered development model, it is 
argued that the old model could still have some contemporary relevance, transforming 
itself into the one adaptable to the new era of globalization and market liberalization. 
 
The Neoliberal Turn 
 
With its foreign reserves rapidly running out in defense of currency devaluation 
and short-term loan repayment, South Korean government had to seek foreign assistance 
in order to avoid total economic collapse derived from the financial meltdown. On 
November 21, 1997, the government officially asked the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for bailout, and the bailout package of then the recode-high 57 billion-dollars was 
signed on December 3, 1997 after protracted negotiations between the Korean 
government and the IMF. In exchange for the financial arrangement, however, the 
government had to agree to follow a specific set of ‘prescriptions’ for economic recovery 
under the explicit IMF guidance during the contract term, which marked the official 
beginning of the new political economy of South Korea at the end of the twentieth 
century.11 
Although it is not unusual for the IMF to demand debtor nations to follow a 
certain set of socioeconomic measures in the expectation of a fast economic recovery and 
solid loan repayment, what was peculiar to the Korean case was that not only were the 
regular crisis-management emergency measures for the assurance of the financial market 
and foreign investors but also fundamental structural reforms across the government, 
                                           
11 See IMF (1997) for the details of the agreement. 
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business, and labor sectors required to implement as a condition of the loan. Moreover, 
despite the multifaceted nature of the economic crisis as discussed in the previous section, 
the IMF prescriptions and solutions to the crisis situation of South Korea were 
exclusively centered on the first perspective because the IMF also believed that the 
collapse of the Korean economy during the AFC was ultimately the failure of the Korean 
developmental system improperly predicated on the collusive relationship between the 
state, bank, and firms. In that vein, the IMF asserted that the overhaul of the existing 
political economy as well as the crisis management emergency measures was essential 
for South Korea if its economy was to recuperate from the crisis and to effectively 
compete in the global market in the future. In particular, the IMF emphasized 1) 
deregulation of the market from the governmental interventions, 2) privatization of public 
enterprise, 3) anti-inflationary macroeconomic retrenchment with fiscal austerity, 4) 
further liberalization on trade and financial market, and 5) broad structural reforms on 
corporate, financial, and government sectors for free international competition (IMF 
1997). 
As can be seen in the list of the policy prescriptions, the goal of the IMF-initiated 
reform program was to completely liberalize Korean economy for open global 
competition with minimal governmental interventions, which also reflects the IMF’s core 
principle of neoliberal globalization. Neoliberalism12, as a continuance and redefinition 
of classical economic liberalism, is a set of ideology and accompanying political and 
economic practices that believe in the fundamentality of self-regulating markets and the 
‘proactive’ role of state as a guarantor of the uninterrupted market functioning with 
                                           
12 A shorthand for ‘neoclassical liberalism’ 
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regard to advancing human well-being (Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; 
Steger and Roy 2010). As opposed to the concept of welfare state and regulatory 
government, the proponents of neoliberalism promote packages of socioeconomic 
policies that secure a market-friendly environment for free movement of financial capital 
and profit, and no trade barriers between nations, ultimately believing in the idealized 
efficiency of self-regulating market for the distribution of goods and services. Unlike in 
the classical liberalism, however, the role of state and regulatory social institutions are 
critical in the implementation and expansion of neoliberalism to the extent that they are 
necessary to guarantee the idealized maximal functioning of free market within actually 
existing institutional limitations: In this theory of political economy, the state should be 
maximally proactive in a way that minimally interferes in the work of free market. 
Considering that the economic ‘miracle’ of South Korea was a creature of strong 
governmental interventions and regulations with ‘artificial’ market controls, therefore, the 
IMF neoliberal structural adjustment program was almost a complete overthrow of the 
entire developmental system that South Korea had effectively utilized for the three 
decades up until the crisis. 
However, it is absolutely mistaken if the implementation of the neoliberal reform 
in South Korea in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is solely attributed to the 
influence of the external institution. Although it is true that the international financial 
institutions such as the IMF played a critical – and more visible – role in the 
implementation of the neoliberal structural adjustment taking advantage of the crisis 
situation, the coercive role of external political agents in the reform process should not be 
exaggerated. If we further examine the dynamics of the neoliberal reform at the deeper 
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level, it was actually the group of the reform-minded Korean elites in the state-capital 
complex who effectively seized the opportunity created by the crisis to advance their 
long-awaited plans and goals for more liberalized and globally integrated economy.13 
Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the fact that 1) market-based reform has 
consistently gone beyond what the IMF initially demanded and 2) there has been no 
attempt to undo previous reform following the repayment of the initial IMF loans (Pirie 
2008). For a considerable period prior to the crisis, key sections of the Korean elite had 
been committed to wholesale neoliberal reform and important reforms were enacted prior 
to the crisis, and the crisis, in this sense, created the political space necessary for 
reformist elites to carry the project that they had initiated well over a decade earlier 
through its logical conclusion. 
As a consequence, even if the rising voices of dissent within the economic 
profession questioned both the logic and the empirical validity of the proposition that an 
abstract, universalistic neoliberal recipe of policy reform could be an appropriate solution 
to re-ignite growth in the crisis-affected East Asian economy (Beeson and Islam 2005), 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration, which was newly elected shortly after the signing 
event of the bailout package in December 1997, carried out the details of the prescription 
with firm determination in subsequent years. As a decades-long dissident politician who 
had been incessantly tortured and repressed by the previous military regimes, President 
Kim Dae-Jung, once elected, tried his best to make a radical reform on the political, 
economic, and social of the passé (Cumings 1999). This effort to sever the relationship 
with the past resulted in the ‘parallel transition to democracy and free market’(Kim and 
                                           
13 The Korean elites had attempted to liberalize the Korean economy in a gradual manner since the early 
1980s but had difficulties to actually implement the restructuring up to the crisis. 
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Shin 2004), and despite his leftist orientation, the implementation of neoliberal structural 
reform ironically began in earnest during his presidency. In specific, systems of corporate 
governance and financial regulation have been completely overhauled so as to bring them 
into conformity with global standards of ‘best practice’ as defined by leading neoliberal 
states and supranational institutions. At the same time, the extensive controls on foreign 
investment that had existed prior to the crisis were dismantled and policy is now framed 
so as to promote rather than prevent the sale of strategic assets to foreign investors. 
Equally importantly, systems of labor regulation have been reformed so as to enhance 
flexibility (the ability of firms to dismiss unwanted employees) and the new welfare 
regime is being constructed so as to prioritize concerns about competitiveness as opposed 
to equality. 
In sum, as a result of the opportune combination of the external pressures and 
internal politics taking advantage of the crisis situation, the ‘neoliberal structural 
adjustment program’ predicated on the market fundamentalism was effectively introduced 
by the IMF then enforced by the new administration as a joint venture, having 
successfully transformed the Korean developmental state into the ‘neoliberal state’ at the 
beginning of the new millennium.14  
 
 
 
                                           
14 See World Bank (1997) for a working definition of the neoliberal state. This report argues that 
governments with both centrally-planned and mixed economies are shrinking their market role because of 
failed state interventions. Instead, the state's role in the institutional environment underlying the economy, 
that is, its ability to enforce a rule of law to underpin transactions, is vital to making government contribute 
more effectively to development. In this vein, the report argues against reducing government to a 
minimalist state, explaining that development requires an effective state that plays a facilitator role in 
encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals. 
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Social Consequences of the Neoliberal Turn: Socioeconomic Polarization and 
Inequality with Neoliberal Characteristics 
 
 The initial outcomes of the IMF-prescribed crisis-management measures were 
more than disappointing: Half of the top thirty chaebols15 went bankrupt in 1998 and a 
fifth of the existing financial institutions closed during the crisis, generating tremendous 
amount of unemployment and social unrest (Asian Development Bank 1999b; Emery 
2001; Gray 2007; Pirie 2008). In hindsight, the failure of the IMF program was very 
much expected since the economic circumstances that beset South Korea at the time of 
the AFC was qualitatively different from the situation that the IMF tried to fix when they 
first designed the structural adjustment program: The fiscal austerity, high interest rates, 
and tax increase that the IMF recommended to South Korea as crisis management 
measures may have worked for Mexico and Argentina in which the root of the problem 
was the profligate state but not for South Korea where the profligate corporate was the 
root cause (Chang 1998; Wade 1998a). 
Despite the initial failures of the IMF crisis management program in controlling 
the faltering economy of South Korea, the neoliberal structural reform agreed upon the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis has been successfully maintained with petty ups and downs 
by the successive administrations over the last decade or so (OECD 2000b; OECD 2007). 
Despite numerous objections and protests against the implementation of the neoliberal 
structural reform especially at the beginning, the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998–
2003) firmly implemented the neoliberal restructuring program and successfully altered 
the fundamentals of Korean society accordingly. Some measurable counteraction was put 
                                           
15 Chaebols are the family-controlled large, diversified conglomerates that have played a key role in the 
industrial development of South Korea, particularly after 1960s 
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into effect under the subsequent Roh Moo-Hyun government (2003–2008), but the 
current conservative Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008–2013) strives to regain the 
currency of the neoliberal reform, declaring that the speed and magnitude of the 
neoliberal restructuring is to be accelerated for upcoming years (e.g. privatization of the 
public enterprise and tax cuts for the rich). As a consequence of the decade-long 
neoliberal reform, South Korea has indeed become a liberalized economy by any 
international standards and fully integrated into the global economy in such a short period 
of time (See Table 1 for some indicators of market openness of South Korea between 
1990 and 2008). 
 
(Table 1 about here – Indicators of Market Openness) 
 
Given that South Korea is now a clearly neoliberal state with a neo-liberal mode 
of governance, what are the social consequences of the decade-long transformation for 
individuals living today? Since South Korea is not the first country that has undergone 
the neoliberal reform, it would be instrumental for the study of South Korea to examine 
other countries in which the ideas of neoliberalism were first introduced and implemented, 
such as the U.S. and the U.K. In the 1970s, the U.S. and the U.K. were suffering from 
‘stagflation’ (economic stagnation, high unemployment, and inflation) triggered by the oil 
crises after the decades-long postwar boom. As a remedy to the chronic problems of the 
stagnant economy and heavily indebted governments, both countries discarded the 
Keynesian stimulus policies, which they had effectively maintained during the postwar 
period, but opted for the neoliberal measures to boost the ailing economies. The results of 
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the implementation of the new political economy, however, have been mixed at best: The 
economy has regained vibrancy to a certain extent but not without substantial 
socioeconomic costs. 
One of the most visible social consequences of the neoliberal transition has been 
a massive increase in socioeconomic inequality and polarization across social groups 
(Blyth 2002; Duménil and Lévy 2004b; Levy and Temin 2007; Piketty and Saez 2003; 
Prasad 2006; Wolff 2002). Since the 1980s, the level of inequality and concentration of 
income and wealth in these countries have dramatically increased and reached the highest 
level in the world. Under the guise of market efficiency and global competition, the gap 
between the rich and the poor has widened, income and wealth have been concentrated in 
the hands of few, and the job security of workers has become more unstable. As befits its 
name, the practice of neoliberal ideologies and policies has indeed created ‘new liberal’ 
socioeconomic environment in which only the ‘fittest’ can survive and enjoy the fruit of 
the neoliberal global expansion (Chomsky 1999; Harvey 2005). 
Not surprisingly, South Korea in the wake of the AFC was no exception to the 
‘rule’ of the neoliberal reform procedure observed elsewhere: The neoliberal measures 
were introduced as a remedy to the ailing economy in the 1990s, the economy 
recuperated from the recession to some extents, but it also had to pay the social cost of 
increasing inequality and polarization. To be more specific, overall macroeconomic 
indicators, such as annual economic growth rate and household consumption level, began 
to recover as early as late 1998 and continuously improved until the recent global 
financial crisis in 2008, the level of inequality, which was effectively maintained low 
during the high economic growth period up to the AFC, substantially rose over the last 
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decade, reaching the unprecedented level (See Table 2 for some principle economic 
indicators and Figure 1 for the trends in Gini coefficients16 and the quintile share ratios17).  
 
(Table 2 about here – Principle Economic Indicators) 
 
(Figure 1 about here – Gini Coefficients and Quintile Share Ratios) 
 
Moreover, the disproportionate impact of the economic crisis and subsequent 
market liberalization measures were particularly visible at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic strata. In 1998 when South Korea suffered most from the direct impact of 
the AFC, for example, the real income of the poorest 20 percent of Koreans fell by almost 
a quarter while that of the wealthiest 10 percent of Koreans only declined by 2.5 percent 
(You and Lee 2000).18 As also seen in the trends of poverty rates in Figure 2 where the 
relative poverty rate19 has reached the highest among the OECD member nations while 
the absolute poverty rate20 falls back to the pre-crisis level, it is those people at the 
bottom of the income strata who did not catch up with the rest of population. With the 
dissipating government support and institutional regulations in favor of free market 
                                           
16 Gini coefficient is the most widely used statistical measure of inequality of income or wealth distribution 
developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects 
complete equality (everyone holds the same income or wealth), and 1, which indicates complete inequality 
(one person has all the income or wealth, all others have none).  
 
17 Quintile share ratio represents the ratio of the average income of the richest 20 percent of the population 
divided by the average income of the bottom 20 percent. 
 
18 The overall GDP of South Korea contracted by 6.9 percent in 1998 compared to the previous year. 
 
19 Relative poverty rate measures the proportion of the population whose accumulated income is less than 
50% of the median income of the population. 
 
20 Absolute poverty rate quantifies the proportion of the population whose accumulated income is below the 
poverty threshold defined by the minimum cost of living in current South Korea.  
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operation, it is not surprising that the rising tide of the economic comeback did not lift all 
boats but the select few. 
  
(Figure 2 about here – Absolute and Relative Poverty Rates) 
 
Acknowledging that this trend of increasing inequality and polarization is 
considered ‘normal’ under the neoliberal restructuring, including South Korea, the rest of 
chapters in this study are devoted to investigate the role that primary socio-demographic 
factors (e.g. education, family wealth, and marital status) have played in the mediation 
and moderation of the diverging socioeconomic parameters and personal well-being 
measures (e.g. income, consumption, and level of life satisfaction). Before I introduce the 
three empirical chapters dealing with each aspect of the personal well-being, however, 
brief descriptions on the dataset and statistical methods employed for this study follow 
first. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Data 
 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) is the most comprehensive 
longitudinal survey that contains various information on the Korean labor market and 
related socioeconomic activities of households and individuals residing in the urban areas 
of South Korea (Korea Labor Institute 2009). Benchmarking the success of other 
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nationally representative panel surveys, such as Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the 
U.S., the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) launched its first wave of KLIPS in year 1998 with 
a sample of 5000 households and their 13,321 household members who are 15 years or 
above and has continued to track the initial samples and branched households on an 
annual basis.21 The original sample of the households was selected by a two-stage 
stratified cluster sampling (random choice of urban households within the Korean Census 
enumeration districts), and the data are principally collected by a direct face-to-face 
interview comprised of separate questionnaires for the household and its all individual 
members aged 15 and above. As of 2011, fourteenth wave of data collection is being 
conducted, and the household and individual datasets from wave 1 through 11 are readily 
available on the Korea Labor Institute website for public use.22 
The major topics of the KLIPS cover both household characteristics (e.g. 
household composition, housing information, and financial condition) and individual 
socioeconomic activities particularly related to labor market (e.g. employment, education, 
income, job training, working conditions and welfare, etc.) with occasional supplemental 
surveys for specific demographic groups. Since the primary goal of this study is 1) to 
evaluate the patterns of socioeconomic polarization under the neoliberal restructuring 
after the 1997 AFC and 2) to investigate the role of crucial socio-demographic factors on 
various measures of personal well-being in the course of the divergence, the KLIPS, with 
its comprehensive and refined measures on various socioeconomic activities, fits best to 
this end, providing a sound longitudinal empirical foundation for this study. 
                                           
21 The original household retention rate is 75.5% by wave 10, which is comparable to other highly regarded 
national panel studies such as the U.S. PSID, the British BHPS, and the German GSOEP. 
 
22 Visit http://www.kli.re.kr/kli_ehome/main/main.jsp for the details. 
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 Methodology 
 
Unlike the dataset, various statistical methods are to be utilized to address 
different topics of each substantive chapter as well as to fully capitalize on the panel 
structure of the KLIPS. In the next chapter that deals with the association between 
education and earnings inequality, the Theil Index decomposition (Theil 1967) is used to 
analyze the rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea by education. In the 
following chapter that examines the potential buffer effect of family wealth on household 
consumption over economic crisis, the Multilevel Model for Change (Singer and Willett 
2003) is adapted to empirically test the dynamics between family wealth and 
consumption in the period of economic crisis and recovery. In the last substantive chapter 
that investigates the relationship between marital status and life satisfaction under 
economic hardships, not only the Multilevel Model for Change is utilized again to model 
the individual trajectories of the level of life satisfaction in post-crisis South Korea by 
marital status, but the Multiple Linear Regression Model (Fox 2008) and the Cumulative 
Logit Model for Ordered Outcomes (Powers and Xie 2000) are also used to test empirical 
association between the two variables particularly at the time of the economic crisis.    
 
First Essay on “Rising Earnings Inequality and the Role of Education” 
 
Among the various aspects of personal well-being, this first essay deals with one 
of the most fundamental dimensions of social stratification and inequality in the 
contemporary capitalist economy: I.e., education and earnings inequality. Numerous 
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studies have attested a strong positive association between the level of education and 
economic returns (e.g. earnings). The robust relationship between education and earnings 
and the persistent earnings inequality across different education groups, however, have 
less been tested to date against institutional or temporal variability. Drawing on the 
decadal experience of South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, this study 
examines the role of education on rising earnings inequality under a radically changing 
institutional environment. In particular, based on the decomposition of the total earnings 
inequality into between- and within-education-group inequalities over the period, two 
competing explanations on the role of education on rising inequality (i.e. market-based vs. 
institution-based explanation) are tested against the context of post-crisis South Korea. 
On the basis of the findings from the Korean Labor Income Panel Study and the Theil 
index decomposition, I conclude that despite the robust association between the level of 
education and the rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea, the substantial 
amount of the change in the overall inequality is primarily attributable to the rapid 
increase in the within-group inequality, which demands institution-based explanations to 
fully account for the changing dynamics of earnings inequality. 
 
Second Essay on the “Buffer Effect of Family Wealth over Economic Crisis” 
 
If one’s earnings comprises the starting point of the material well-being chain in 
the capitalist society, at the end of the chain lies the level of consumption. As another 
critical measure of personal well-being and a broader concept of one’s living standards 
than earnings, the level of household consumption and its trajectories after the AFC are 
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empirically examined in this essay. In so doing, I pay particular attention to the role of 
family wealth in determination of the level and pattern of household consumption in the 
post-crisis South Korea, aiming to evaluate the impact of family wealth on household 
consumption behavior in the course of economic crisis and recovery. In particular, 
hypothesizing that the possession of liquid financial wealth would mitigate the adverse 
impact of economic crisis on the level of household consumption, I investigate the 
differential impacts of household assets on the trajectories of household consumption 
over economic crisis in comparison to the ensuing period of stable economic growth. 
Drawing on the decadal experience of South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, I not only evaluate and confirm the buffer 
effect of family wealth as “consumption potential” realized at the time when it is indeed 
in need but also further the discussion over the implications of wealth ownership for 
socio-behavioral outcomes of individuals and households.  
 
Third Essay on “Marital Status and Life Satisfaction under Economic Hardships” 
 
Lastly, in addition to the two material aspects of personal well-being studied in 
the previous essays (i.e. earnings and consumption), this last essay concerns a subjective 
dimension of personal well-being, such as one’s level of life satisfaction, in post-crisis 
South Korea. In particular, I examine the reported level of life satisfaction in reference to 
one’s marital status to test if the “marriage premium” in subjective well-being still holds 
for the married even during the economically challenging times. Numerous studies have 
attested various benefits of marriage on individual’s physical and emotional well-being: 
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Married people not only tend to live longer than the non-married but they also stay 
physically and emotionally healthier throughout their lifetime. However, does the 
marriage premium remain unchallenged during the period of severe economic hardships? 
In particular, would married people still report higher level of life satisfaction than the 
non-married even under severe economic hardships such as economic crisis? In addition, 
when most people report a higher level of life satisfaction as the economy recovers from 
crisis, do the responses of the married show a different pattern than the rest of people? In 
order to empirically test these two hypotheses regarding marital status and the level of 
life satisfaction under economic hardships, I draw on the experience of South Korea 
between 1998 and 2001 when South Korea suffered most from the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. Based on the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study and three different sets of 
regression analyses, I not only confirm that the marriage premium on life satisfaction is 
still valid even at the time of economic crisis but also show that the trajectories of life 
satisfaction in the course of economic recovery differ by marital status. 
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Chapter 2 
Rising Earnings Inequality and the Role of Education 
 
 
The role of education on one’s welfare is more than crucial in contemporary 
society: Not only does it facilitate to secure one’s higher socioeconomic status within a 
stratification system, but it also enhances various social and biological functionalities of 
individuals throughout their lifetime. In particular, the effect of educational attainment on 
one’s earnings potential is well documented both in sociology and economics, and 
numerous studies have attested the existence of the strong positive correlation between 
the level of education and its economic returns (e.g. earnings), net of potential 
confounding factors such as individual’s talent and family background.  
The robust relationship between education and earnings and the persistent 
earnings inequality across education groups, however, have less been tested to date 
against temporal and contextual variability. For instance, is the earnings gap and 
inequality across different educational categories stable over time? If it varies, under what 
circumstances does the gap converge or diverge? Does the pattern of 
convergence/divergence interact with existing structural or institutional arrangements? 
Moreover, what is the relationship between the level of education and rising inequality? 
Although it sounds reasonable to directly associate rising earnings inequality with 
education, the extent to which one’s level of education contributes to rising inequality 
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over time is less obvious than it seems, let alone its implications for the study of 
inequality and stratification. 
In order to address these issues on empirical grounds, this study investigates the 
potential variability of the earnings inequality by education under radically changing 
institutional settings. In particular, based on the hypotheses that 1) the relationship 
between education and earnings inequality is not constant over time and 2) the changing 
relationship interacts with external institutional factors, I examine the role of education 
on rising earnings inequality, drawing on the decadal experience of South Korea after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. South Korea, once known for its rapid economic 
development with relatively equal income distribution, has experienced an unprecedented 
level of rise in income inequality since the mid-1990s, particularly after the 1997 crisis. 
Although there exist many factors that contributed to the rising inequality of post-crisis 
South Korea, I focus on its association with education, analyzing the proportion of the 
increase in the overall inequality due to the changing inequalities between education 
groups. Furthermore, based on the result of this exploratory analysis, I also discuss two 
competing hypotheses on the role of education on rising inequality (i.e. market-based vs. 
institution-based accounts) in search of the explanations for the changing contours of the 
rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea. 
In testing the empirical foundations of the hypotheses, data extracted from the 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study and various national statistics have been utilized 
along with the Theil index decomposition. Theil index decomposition is a particularly 
useful statistical tool in this regard not only because it is a widely used measure of 
distributive inequality but it also possesses all the desirable properties for a measure of 
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earnings inequality, including additive decomposability (i.e. decomposition of the overall 
inequality into between- and within-group inequalities). Since the primary goal of this 
study is to document the rising inequality of post-crisis South Korea as well as to account 
for the increase in the overall earnings inequality in terms of education, the Theil index 
and its decomposed values for between- and within-education group inequalities are more 
than crucial to test the hypotheses for this study.  
In the following sections, the details of the theories, hypotheses, and analysis of 
this study are presented. First, two competing explanations over the role of education on 
rising inequality are discussed in order to set up the hypotheses. Second, the backdrop of 
this study – South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – is briefly introduced as a 
context of the study. In the analysis section, data, measures, and the Theil index are 
explained in detail followed by results. Lastly, based on these empirical analyses, I seek 
the implications of the rising earnings inequality and the role of education for the study of 
inequality and stratification in the concluding section. 
 
Rising Inequality and the Role of Education: Theories and Hypotheses 
 
The significance of education on one’s general welfare is almost universal, 
affecting individual’s various socioeconomic parameters throughout his or her life course 
(e.g. occupation, income, and civil engagement). Of the multiple socioeconomic 
functionalities of education, one of the most salient features in the current capitalistic 
system is its strong positive association with earnings: In general, the higher one’s 
educational attainment, the higher one’s earnings potential, net of individual talent or 
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family background (Angrist and Kreuger 1991; Becker 1993; Blundell, Dearden, 
Goodman, and Reed 2000; Card 1999; Tsai and Xie 2008). Although theories on what 
render education particularly valuable and pecuniary in the contemporary society vary 
across perspectives (e.g. human capital, credentialism, screening hypothesis, and cultural 
capital), there is no objection to the existence of earnings inequality by education, which 
is regarded as more than a proxy of one’s innate talent or economic potential in the 
current socioeconomic system. 
  What is less known, however, is the variability of the association over time and 
space: Does the differential earnings returns to education – thus the earnings inequality 
by education – remain constant regardless of temporal or contextual changes? In other 
words, how does the association between the two variables interact with external 
circumstances such as economic crisis and institutional reforms? Even if the association 
between education and earning inequality has been proven robust in the existing literature, 
this does not necessarily imply invariability over time and space, demanding a relevant 
but separate set of questions to be addressed specifically for this issue. Moreover, since it 
is well known that the association is not only defined by market forces (e.g. demand and 
supply) but also by institutional factors (e.g. minimum wage, unionization, and 
governmental policies), to investigate how earnings inequality by education is shaped and 
structured by power and inequality that originate outside the marketplace is also essential 
to further the sociological understanding of the dynamics (Morris and Western 1999).  
 Of potentially many patterns of the changing association between education and 
earnings inequality over time and space, I pay particular attention to the role of education 
on rising earnings inequality – i.e. the amount of contribution that one’s level of 
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education makes to the increase in the overall earnings inequality over time. This is 
because, although it is feasible that educational attainment can be associated with 
decreasing earnings inequality under particular temporal or contextual settings, what has 
been more commonly observed in the recent decades across the globe is rising earnings 
inequality within a country (Firebaugh 2003), and the increase in the overall inequality is 
often attributed to diverging earnings returns to education. Considering the robust 
association between education and earnings inequality in the existing literature, this claim 
on the role of education on rising earnings inequality sounds reasonable enough, but since 
the extent to which how much of the statement is empirically valid is less known than it 
claims, I aim to examine the association in a specific temporal and spatial context to 
critically evaluate the statement.  
 Before stating specific hypotheses for this study, I first explore two major 
theoretical accounts on the rising earnings inequality (i.e. market-based vs. institution-
based explanation), both of which implicitly or explicitly discuss the role of education in 
the process. First, the former argues that the primary cause of the observed rising 
earnings inequality is the combined consequence of 1) the rising demand for highly 
educated workers due to technological changes and 2) downward wage pressure for low-
skilled and less-educated workers from globalization (Card and DiNardo 2002; Katz and 
Autor 1999). On the one hand, constant changes and upgrades in modern technologies 
require workforce to be equipped with comparable skills and education, and this trend of 
the ‘skill-biased technical changes (SBTC)’ in the contemporary capitalism naturally 
incur higher demand and wage for highly skilled workers, widening earnings inequalities 
in favor of the highly educated. On the other hand, the increasing force of globalization – 
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notably by free trade and immigration – put extra competitive pressure on low-skilled 
workers, resulting in deteriorating wage conditions for the less educated. As a result, the 
earnings gaps and inequalities between education groups increase over time, and, as long 
as the SBTC and globalization work in favor of the highly educated workers, the rising 
earnings inequality by education is supposed to continue as a natural consequence of the 
logic of the market mechanism.   
On the contrary, the institution-based stance argues that it is not the indifferent 
market forces of technological changes or globalization but various institutional changes 
(e.g. labor unions, social norms, and political power) that cause the rising earnings 
inequality (DiPrete 2007; Levy and Temin 2007; Piketty and Saez 2003; Pontusson, 
Rueda, and Way 2002). Although this alternative perspective acknowledges the positive 
and significant association between education and earnings inequality, but it differentiates 
it from the role of education on rising earnings inequality: Regardless of the static 
association between education and earnings, the variability of the association over time 
and space is primarily defined by changes in institutional factors. The rationale behind 
this alternative perspective is as follows: The recent trend in rising earnings inequality is 
not caused by the SBTC or globalization but by changes in institutions and social forces 
that allow those in power to effectively take more of the economic shares than before. If 
the rising earnings inequality is indeed the result of the SBTC and globalization, why 
don’t we observe the same pattern of the growing inequality across countries that are 
equally affected by the same market forces (DiPrete 2007)? In addition, to a certain 
extent, the impact of SBTC and globalization has always been present throughout the 
history of human development; but why has the association between education and 
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earnings inequality been variable despite the constant effect of technological innovations 
and globalization? Moreover, if the rising inequality is primarily due to the college 
premium – as the marketists argue – why do we observe more of the growing earnings 
inequality within the college-educated group than between education groups? Since it is 
not possible to explain a variable (i.e. differential rising earnings inequality by education 
across countries) with a constant (i.e. the force of SBTC and globalization), the 
institutionalists argue that the market-based explanation is not enough to explain the 
dynamics of rising earnings inequality, searching for alternative explanations based on 
institutional factors such as the rise and fall of the organized labor (Western and 
Rosenfeld 2011). In sum, from the institutional view point, the role of education on the 
rising earnings inequality is not as clear as the market-based explanations, and despite the 
robust relationship between education and earnings inequality, the issue demands a 
separate set of empirical investigations that allows its potential interaction with existing 
institutional frameworks. 
 In an attempt to test these two competing explanations on the role of education on 
the rising earnings inequality, therefore, I test the following hypotheses in this study:  
  
Hypothesis 1: The association between education and earnings inequality is not 
constant over time and space, and the direction of the association is 
open to empirical investigation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In this study, the role of education on rising earnings inequality is to be 
empirically tested. To be specific, if the rising earnings inequality is due 
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to the college premium driven by the SBTC and globalization, we 
expect to see widening earnings inequality between education groups 
when we decompose the increase in the overall earning inequality into 
the between-group-education and within-group-education inequalities. 
If the rising earnings inequality is due to other factors than rising 
college premium, however, we expect to see the reverse trend, i.e. the 
increase in the overall earning inequality primarily driven by the rising 
within-education-group inequality.  
 
Although the empirical evidences and tests to these hypotheses are exploratory at best, 
not giving definitive answers to judge between the market-based and the institution-based 
arguments, they would definitely provide another firm empirical ground on which the 
study of the role of education on rising earnings inequality is further to be investigated.  
 Before discussing the details of the data and analytic methods utilized for this 
study, I briefly introduce the temporal and spatial context of this study in the following 
section – i.e. the decadal experience of South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
During the period, South Korea not only experienced a rapid increase in income 
inequality to the unprecedented level but also underwent substantial institutional reforms 
in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis. Although the coincidence was not exceptional 
for South Korea compared to other industrial countries that also underwent the similar 
socioeconomic restructuring procedure with the rising income inequality since the 1980s, 
South Korea would provide a unique venue to test the suggested hypotheses given its 
unique history of development and inequality.    
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The Backdrop of Study: South Korea After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis  
 
 South Korea, once known for its rapid economic growth with relatively equal 
income distribution, started to experience a rapid increase in income inequality since the 
early 1990s, particularly after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (See Figure 1).  
 
(Figure 1 about here – Gini Coefficients and Quintile Share Ratios) 
 
As opposed to the prediction of the Kuznets curve23, the level of inequality in South 
Korea substantially decreased during the period of the rapid industrialization and 
economic development (1960s – 1980s) and started to rise as the economy moves toward 
a post-industrialization era with a globalization drive since the early 1990s. This trend of 
rising inequality has particularly accelerated after the 1997 crisis, and as can be seen in 
the trend of the quintile share ratios in the figure, it has been primarily led by the 
substantial gains of the top income group. 
 Then who are the top income group that disproportionately gained from the post-
crisis economic recovery in the midst of the rapidly rising income inequality? Are they 
the highly educated workers who the marketists predict to enjoy the college premium 
driven by the SBTC and globalization since 1990s or those who were able to take 
advantage of the post-crisis institutional reforms, which has less to do with the level of 
education? Moreover, why did the trend suddenly accelerate after the 1997 crisis? In 
order to answer these questions and the hypotheses stated in the previous section, the 
                                           
23 Simon Kuznet (1955) speculated that industrialization has a nonlinear effect on income inequality, with 
inequality increasing as nations begin to industrialize and then declining at later stages of industrialization. 
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questions first need to be situated in the proper context – South Korea in the wake of the 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) – which started from Thailand in the 
summer of 1997, then swiftly spread to the rest of East Asian countries by the end of the 
same year – significantly debilitated most East and South East Asian economies at the 
time.24 Although the crisis was relatively short-lived, followed by a steady economic 
recovery across the region, the speed and magnitude of the Asia’s collective stumble, the 
erosion of the wealth, and the increases in poverty and social insecurity during the crisis 
were massive enough to be referred to as the regional equivalent of the Great Depression 
in the 1930s (Wade 1998a).  
South Korea, once praised as the exemplar of the developmental state (Woo-
Cumings 1999) up to the crisis, was among the hardest hit by the financial crisis, 
suffering the worst economic recession since the Korean War in the early 1950s. Facing 
massive capital flight with its own foreign reserves rapidly running out, Korean banks 
and chaebols25 were unable to pay back international loans in time, and in the end, the 
government had to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency bailouts so 
as not to confront the worst scenario of national bankruptcy.  
In exchange for then the record-high 57 billon-dollar loans from the IMF and 
other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), however, the government had to accept 
and implement so-called IMF’s ‘structural adjustment program’ based on neoliberal 
economic policies of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization (See IMF (1997) for 
                                           
24 Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea were particularly hit hard by the crisis. 
 
25 Chaebols are the family-controlled large, diversified conglomerates that have played a key role in the 
industrial development of South Korea, particularly after 1960s. 
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the details of the agreement).26 Although the general attempts to liberalize Korean market 
had been gradually implemented since the early 1980s when the economy of South Korea 
was still under the influence of the dirigiste state (Pirie 2008; Woo 1991),27 the wholesale 
implementation of the neoliberal economic restructuring program in the midst of the deep 
recession was critical and abrupt enough to substantially transform the constitution of 
Korean society within the short period of time. Given that the economic ‘miracle’ of 
South Korea during the pre-crisis era was a creature of strong governmental interventions 
and market controls (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; World Bank 1993), the list of the 
recommendations jointly decided by the government and the IMF upon the crisis was 
almost the abandonment of the developmental system that South Korea had effectively 
utilized for the three decades or so up until the crisis (Shin and Chang 2003).  
While the Korean economy began to recover as early as 1999, the crisis and the 
subsequent economic restructuring premised on the new ideology left an indelible mark 
on the Korean political economy, substantially transforming the Korean “developmental 
state” into the neoliberal state (Gray 2007; Pirie 2008; Woo 2007a; Woo 2007b).28  
                                           
26 The structural adjustment program recommended by the IMF at the time consisted of two sets of policy 
measures; first, as an immediate measure to recover ‘investor’s confidence’ right after the crisis, the 
program called on crisis-struck nations to cut back on government spending to reduce deficits, 
allow insolvent banks and financial institutions to fail, and aggressively raise interest rates based on the 
reasoning that these steps would restore confidence in the nations' fiscal solvency, penalize insolvent 
companies, and protect currency values. Secondly, as a measure for long-term economic restructuring 
aligned with the logic of neoliberalism, the borrowing nations were suggested to follow a set of 
socioeconomic policies that emphasize more of the role of free-market mechanisms vis-à-vis the state 
intervention in the distribution of goods and services. 
 
27 The drive to the liberal economy was actually initiated from the mid-1990s under the phrase of 
Seigyehwa (i.e. globalization), but actual implementation of specific policies started after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis in earnest as a way to overcome the cirisis. 
 
28 The neoliberal state is the mode of governance in which free-market mechanisms are more encouraged 
for the distribution of goods and services as opposed to the Keynesian welfare state that was prominent in 
the Golden Age of capitalism roughly between 1945 and 1973 in the global economy. 
 
 40 
 
Among the many changes derived from the transformation, the most arresting to the 
general public has been a significant increase in inequality, insecurity, and poverty in 
spite of the steady economic comeback after the crisis, emerging as the salient social 
problems of post-crisis South Korea (Lim and Jang 2006; Shin 2011). In particular, 
although overall macroeconomic indicators, such as annual economic growth rates and 
household consumption level, began to recuperate as early as late 1998 and continuously 
improved until the recent global financial crisis in 2008, the distributional inequality 
measures, such as the Gini coefficient29 and quintile share ratio30, have become the worst 
in the recent history of Korean economic development (See Table 2 for some principle 
economic indicators and refer back to Figure 1 for the trends in the Gini coefficient and 
the quintile share ratio since the early 1990s). With its conventional developmental 
strategies of strong state interventions and coordination of the market gradually removed 
from most policy domains, South Korea has become more liberal economy extensively 
integrated into the global market, in which individual competition and merit-based 
reward systems have been strengthened ever. 
 
(Table 2 about here – Principle Economic Indicators of South Korea) 
 
Now back to the original questions and hypotheses stated earlier: Given the 
substantial rise in income inequality in post-crisis South Korea and the disproportionate 
                                           
29 GINI coefficient is the most widely used statistical measure of inequality of income or wealth 
distribution developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini. The coefficient varies between 0, which 
reflects complete equality (everyone holds the same income or wealth), and 1, which indicates complete 
inequality (one person has all the income or wealth, all others have none).  
 
30 Quintile share ratio represents the ratio of the average income of the richest 20 percent of the population 
divided by the average income of the bottom 20 percent, expressing the income of the rich as multiples of 
that of the poor. 
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gains of the income by different income groups, what are the primary mechanisms that 
have driven this trend? Is it the diverging earnings returns to education caused by the 
SBTC and globalization or the result of the post-crisis institutional restructuring that 
South Korea implemented as a response to the crisis? Before attempting to answer these 
substantial questions, let us first look at the trends of earnings by one’s level of education 
in South Korea at the descriptive level: 
 
(Figure 3 here – Earnings Trends by Education (KOSIS31)) 
 
(Figure 4 here – Earnings Trends by Education (KLIPS32)) 
 
Although it is not possible to separate the independent effect of one claim from the other 
since only one time-series dataset of one country is dealt with in this study, an informed 
judgment between the two competing accounts can be made based on the analysis of the 
trends by education as stated in the hypotheses. In the following section, the details of the 
dataset, variables, and analytic methods used to empirically test the hypotheses are 
introduced. 
  
Decomposition of Earnings Inequality by Education in Post-Crisis South Korea 
(1997-2006) 
 
Data and Analytic Sample 
                                           
31 Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/eng/) 
 
32 Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (http://www.kli.re.kr/klips/en/about/introduce.jsp) 
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Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) is the most comprehensive 
longitudinal survey that contains various information on the Korean labor market and 
related socioeconomic activities of households and individuals residing in the urban areas 
of South Korea (Korea Labor Institute 2009). Benchmarking the success of other 
nationally representative panel surveys, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in 
the U.S., the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) launched its first wave of KLIPS in year 1998 
with a sample of 5000 households and their 13,321 household members, who are 15 years 
or above, and has continuously tracked the initial samples and branched households on an 
annual basis.33 The original sample of the households was selected by a two-stage 
stratified cluster sampling (random choice of urban households within the Korean Census 
enumeration districts), and the data are principally collected by a direct face-to-face 
interview comprised of separate questionnaires for the household and its all individual 
members aged 15 and above. As of 2011, the fourteenth wave of data collection is being 
conducted, and the household and individual datasets from wave 1 through 11 are readily 
available on the Korea Labor Institute website for public use.34 
The major topics of the KLIPS cover both household characteristics (e.g. 
household composition, housing information, and financial condition) and individual 
socioeconomic activities particularly related to labor market (e.g. employment, education, 
income, job training, working conditions and welfare, etc.) with occasional supplemental 
surveys for specific demographic groups. Since the primary goal of this study is analyze 
earnings inequality by education, the analytic sample for this study is limited to wage 
                                           
33 The original household retention rate is 75.5% by wave 10, which is comparable to other highly regarded 
national panel studies such as the U.S. PSID, the British BHPS, and the German GSOEP. 
 
34 Visit http://www.kli.re.kr/kli_ehome/main/main.jsp for the details. 
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earners aged 26 and above, resulting in 6020 individuals with 29,155 person-year 
observations between 1997 and 2006. 
 
Measures 
 
 The dependent variable of this study is individual’s average monthly wages in 
Korean Won (₩), and the primary independent variable is the respondent’s level of 
education categorized into three different groups – 1) equal or less than high school, 2) 2-
3 year junior college, and 3) four-year university and above, reflecting clear divisions 
between the categories in the Korean education system.35 The descriptive statistics of 
these variables for the decade (1997 – 2006) are summarized in Table 3 below. 
 
(Table 3 about here – Descriptive Statistics of the Variables) 
 
  
Analytic Method: The Theil Index Decomposition as a Measure of Inequality 
 
 Inequality indicates the absence of equality in which a certain item of interest is 
not equally distributed across individual units. Various indexes of inequality have been 
suggested to measure the degree of inequality (e.g. the Gini index, variance-based 
measures, and the Generalized Entropy measures), and each index captures different 
                                           
35 As of 2008, over 99% middle-middle school graduates advance to high schools and over 80% of high-
school graduates to some types of colleges in South Korea, thus the qualitative distinction between the 
three categories is much more crucial than the quantitative difference within each group when it comes to 
its effect on various socioeconomic outcomes.   
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aspects of the distributional inequality with its own advantages and disadvantages. Of the 
popular measures widely used in practice, I utilize the Theil index this study, not only 
because the Theil index is best suited to address the research questions posed earlier, but 
it also possess more ‘desirable’ properties as an index of inequality compared to other 
popular measures. Before the details of the Theil index is further discussed, I briefly 
explain 1) what all of the inequality indexes are generally trying to measure in common 
and 2) the list of desirable properties for inequality measures. 
 
1) Income Inequality as the Average Disproportionality 
 
 In general, the standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini index and the 
Theil index, contain the same theoretical concept behind the different metrics – i.e. 
inequality as an average disproportionality (Firebaugh 1999; Firebaugh 2003; Reardon 
and Firebaugh 2002). According to this conceptualization, inequality occurs when units 
of interest (e.g. individuals or households) possess disproportionate shares of the item of 
interest (e.g. income or consumption) in comparison to the mean of the entire unit 
values.36 For instance, when individual income is defined X and the arithmetic mean of 
all the individual incomes X�, the ratio of the individual income to the mean income (X/X�) 
represents the degree of individual deviation from the mean. Unless all the individuals 
share the same level of income, the individual ratios vary around the ratio of equality, 
which is 1.0, and the average distance of the individual deviations from the mean 
represents the degree of inequality. Based on this principle of average proportionality, the 
                                           
36 Thus it is uneven income growth – non income growth per se – that leads to growing income inequality: 
Because income growth per se results in bigger gaps but not greater inequality, it is a logical fallacy to infer 
growing income inequality from growing income gaps. 
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standard inequality measures aggregate all individual unit deviations into a single 
summary value with its own distinctive metrics depending on the definition of the 
individual unit ratio function. 
 
2) Four Desirable Properties for a Measure of Income Inequality 
 
Despite the conceptual similarities among the standard measures of inequality, not 
all of them equally possess the desirable properties as an index of inequality. In general, 
an ideal inequality index is supposed to be 1) invariant to unit/scale changes of the unit 
values (“scale invariance”), 2) responsive to transfers between individual units at all 
points of the distribution (“principle of transfers”), and 3) consistent with the principle 
that income transfers among the poor are more consequential than income transfers 
among the rich (“the welfare principle”). In addition, as in this study, most social studies 
are interested in the decomposition of overall income inequality by socio-demographic 
groups, thus it would also be useful if the inequality measure can be 4) additively 
decomposed into between- and within-group inequalities (“additive decomposability”). 
Since the Theil index satisfies all these four criteria – and these conditions are essential to 
testing the primary hypotheses of this study, I focus on the Theil index here, analyzing the 
inequality trend of post-crisis South Korea as well as its decomposed components by the 
three education categories. 
 
3) The Theil Index and Its Decomposition by Education Categories 
  
 46 
 
Along with the Gini index and the variance of logged incomes, the Theil index 
(Theil 1967) is a single summary measure of distributional inequality widely used in the 
study of income inequality (Allison 1978). As with other standard measures, the Theil 
index represents the degree of income inequality in terms of the average 
disproportionality computed from individual income ratios, but unlike other inequality 
measures, it possesses all the four desirable properties for an inequality measure 
discussed in the previous section, including the additive decomposability. In particular, 
the Theil index, T, is defined as the arithmetic mean of the individual income ratios 
weighted by its logged value: 
 
 T = 1N��xix� � ln �xix� �N
i=1
, (1)  
 
where xi denotes individual income, ?̅? the mean income, and 𝑙𝑙 �
𝑥𝑖
?̅?
� the natural logarithm 
of the individual income ratio. According to this definition, the minimum value of the 
Theil index is 0, in which everyone in the population has the same level of income, and 
the maximum value lnN with one individual possessing the entire income in the 
population.37  
 As can be seen in the technical details of equation (1), the Theil index satisfies the 
four basic criteria for a desirable inequality index explained in the previous section: Not 
only the index value remains the same with the proportional income changes across 
individuals in the population (“scale invariance”), but it also changes if income transfers 
                                           
37 If everyone’s earnings is the same in the population, then xi=μ so that the natural logarithm of xi=μ 
becomes 0 for all individuals in the population. 
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are made from the rich to the poor and vice versa (“principle of transfers”). In addition, 
because the change in T depends on the ratio of the incomes weighted by its natural 
logarithm, the lower the level of income, the more sensitive T is to transfers so that if it is 
assumed that income has diminishing marginal utility (i.e. an income transfer at higher 
levels of income is less significant than the same transfer at lower levels of income), the 
T well represents “the welfare principle” in its formulation.  
The most relevant feature of the Theil index for this study, however, is the last 
criteria of the ideal inequality measure: “additive decomposability”. As seen in equation 
(2) below, the Theil index has a sort of fractal structure in which the total inequality can 
be additively decomposed into two independent parts – between-group and within-group 
inequalities – however the group is defined. In specific, the T as defined in equation (1) is 
a weighted sum of the between-group index value and the within-group index value: 
 
 T = 1N��xix� � ln �xix� �N
i=1
= �pj �x�jx� � ln �x�jx� �J
j=1
+ �pj �x�jx� �TjJ
j=1
, (2)  
 
where pj is the population share of group j, x� Rj the group-specific mean, and Tj is the Theil 
index for group j. Since the primary goal of this study is to analyze the rising earnings 
inequality of post-crisis South Korea in terms of the amount of inequalities attributable to 
one’s level of education, the Theil index and its decomposed values by the three 
education groups would provide empirical evidences to test the hypotheses.  
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Results 
  
 As can be seen in Figure 5 and Table 4, the total earnings inequality in South 
Korea measured by the Theil index has continuously increased between 1997 and 2006 
from 0.151 to 0.280 (almost 85% increase over the decade).   
 
(Figure 5 about here – Theil Index Decomposition by Education) 
 
(Table 4 about here – Theil Index Decomposition by Education) 
 
What is notable from the change, however, is the amount of the increased inequality 
attributable to the rising within-group inequality: Although the between-group inequality 
also substantially contributed to the increase in the total inequality (18.5%), the rest of 
increase (81.5%) is due to the rising inequality within each education group.38 
 Then which education category contributed most to the rising within-group 
inequality? The amount of the contribution each education group made to the rising 
within-group inequality during the period is presented in Figure 6 below: 
 
(Figure 6 about here – Within-Group Inequality Trends by Education) 
 
Although the within-group inequality increased across the three education groups, 
earnings heterogeneity within the least educated group (Highschool or less) is the largest 
                                           
38 Between-group contribution = (0.054-0.030)/(0.280-0.151) = 0.184; Within-group contribution = (0.226-
0.121)/(0.280-0.151) = 0.816 
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followed by the most educated group (4year-college and above) and the middle group (2-
3 year college).39 The details of the rising earnings inequality within each group, which in 
turn contribute the rising total within inequality, are presented in Table 5.  
 
(Table 5 about here – Within-Group Inequality Trends by Education) 
 
 In sum, despite the robust association between earnings and the level of education 
during the decade of post-crisis South Korea, most of the increase in overall inequality is 
due to the increase in within-education-group inequality, which demands additional 
explanations other than the role played by education.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Since the 1980s, most countries have observed a substantial rise in within-nation 
income inequality, including both industrial and industrializing countries (Firebaugh 1999; 
Firebaugh 2003; Goesling 2001). Some argue that the trend of rising earnings inequality 
is primarily due to the diverging earnings returns to education in favor of highly educated 
workers – which is in turn driven by the skill-biased technical change and globalization – 
while others argue that it is the changes in institutions, norms, and political power that 
have altered the association between education and earnings inequality to the advantage 
of those in power. Since both perspectives equally acknowledge the strong positive 
association between education and earnings inequality at the cross-sectional level, what 
                                           
39 The sum of the three within-group inequalities weighted by its income share in the distribution is the total 
within-inequality presented in Table 5 (e.g. for year 2006, the total within-group inequality (0.226) = 
(0.284*0.514) + (0.128*0.100) + (0.175*0.386)) 
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has been contentious is whether the association between education and earnings 
inequality is invariable over time and space and whether the extent to which the observed 
rising earnings inequality – or changing earnings inequality in general – is associated 
with the level of education. Given the well-established positive association between 
education and earnings inequality in the existing literature, it may seem obvious to 
assume that education must have played a significant role on rising earnings inequality as 
well.  
In this study, I have examined the decadal experience of South Korea after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis in order to provide another empirical ground to judge 
between the two competing explanations on the role of education on rising earnings 
inequality. South Korea has experienced a rapid increase in income inequality since the 
mid-1990s, and the trend accelerated particularly after the 1997 crisis in which South 
Korea underwent a series of radical institutional reforms toward a more globally-
integrated liberal economy. Under this new institutional arrangement where marketable 
skills are supposed to yield higher economic returns than before, individuals with more 
socioeconomic resources are better positioned to take advantage of various opportunities, 
thus it is expected that the highly educated, who possess one of the most crucial 
socioeconomic resources in the capitalist economy, may have gained more from the post-
crisis economic recovery, contributing to the increasing inequality after the 1997 crisis. In 
other words, if the rising earnings inequality of post-crisis South Korea is indeed due to 
the skill-biased technical change and globalization that favor highly educated workers – 
as argued by marketists – the observed increase in the earning inequality ought to be 
significantly associated with the level of education under the environment created by the 
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post-crisis socioeconomic restructuring (Blau and Kahn 2002).  
Against this particular temporal and spatial context, the dynamics between 
education and rising earnings inequality was analyzed, and what I have documented is 
that despite the robust relationship between education and rising earnings inequality, the 
substantial portion of the increase in the post-crisis South Korea earnings inequality is 
primarily attributable to the rise in within-education-group inequalities: Over 80% of the 
increase in the overall level of earnings inequality between 1997 and 2006 is due to the 
sharp rise in the within-group inequalities for all three education categories. Namely, the 
role of education on the rising earnings inequality of post-crisis South Korea was not 
substantial at best, and if we want to properly understand the processes and mechanisms 
of the post-crisis earnings inequality, it is necessary to investigate institutional factors 
other than education that have contributed to the rising within-group inequality.    
Then what are the potential candidates of the institutional factors that merit 
further investigation in this respect? Given the nature of earnings inequality, they can be 
classified into two groups of changes, both of which contribute to rising inequality with 
different dynamics: 1) a set of institutional measures that favor employers/capital at the 
expense of labor (e.g. casualization of labor and regressive tax system) and 2) those that 
further disadvantage labor at the bottom of the income strata (e.g. weak social safety nets 
and conditional welfare provisioning). To be more specific, according to the experience 
of Western countries that underwent a similar set of ‘neoliberal’ reforms before South 
Korea (e.g. the U.S. after Reagan and the U.K. after Thatcher), the decline of the 
organized labor, stagnant minimum wage, casualization of labor, and shrinking welfare 
benefits – the consequences of the ongoing neoliberal restructuring effort for labor 
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market ‘flexibility’ – have been pointed out as the prominent factors that have contributed 
to rising earnings inequality since 1980s (Card and DiNardo 2002; Card, Lemieux, and 
Riddell 2004; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Kenworthy 2004; Lee 1999; Morris 
and Western 1999). In particular, the decline of the organized labor has been singled out 
as a critical institutional factor having had as much an impact on the rising earnings 
inequality as differential earnings returns to education in the U.S. (Card 2001; Western 
and Rosenfeld 2011). 
Of the institutional/structural changes listed above, what have been particularly 
significant to the rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea include 1) 
casualization of labor (i.e. increasing use of temporary/non-regular workers over regular 
workers on permanent contracts), 2) employment quality/stability by firm size, and 3) 
historically underdeveloped social safety nets and welfare system. First of all, over 90 
percent of all new jobs created between 1998 and 2002 after the crisis were non-
permanent, and wages for the non-regular workers have been stagnant while regular 
workers have seen their wage growing at close to double digits over the period (IMF 
2004). Given that the proportion of temporary/non-regular workers (46%) was already 
high in South Korea compared to other OECD countries before the crisis (OECD 2000a), 
the acceleration in the casualization of labor after the crisis is further to worsen the 
earnings inequality between regular and non-regular workers. Second, the differential 
employment quality and stability by firm size has further contributed to the widening 
inequality among wage workers. Regular workers employed by large firms in South 
Korea have been traditionally well protected compared to their counterparts in small and 
medium size firms, and the gaps in earnings and employment security between the two 
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groups have been widened in the wake of the 1997 crisis (Koo 2001). Lastly, unlike the 
U.K. or the U.S., the neoliberal restructuring of post-crisis South Korea occurred in the 
virtual absence of the welfare state: While the implementation of the neoliberal policy 
measures in the two industrial countries was reactionary to the expansion of the 
Keynesian welfare state until 1970s, the introduction of neoliberalism in South Korea 
was rather exogenous, having been implemented as a response to the problems of the 
former authoritarian dirigiste state devoid of any collective welfare system. Accordingly, 
the initial level of welfare benefits was substantially lower in South Korea, and it has 
been continuously maintained low during the ensuing restructuring period due to the very 
logic of the neoliberal state (Cumings 1979; Gills 2000; Goodman, White, and Kwon 
1998). This has exposed the substantial portion of the Korean population to the double 
jeopardy of under-protection and diminishing institutional supports, which further 
disadvantage workers at the bottom of income strata.  
Therefore, unless the institutional/structural changes listed above are taken into 
account – though nowhere near exhaustive – it is not possible to fully understand the 
dynamics of the rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea in particular and the 
changing contours of earnings inequality across the globe observed under the current 
mode of capitalist development in general. While the analysis premised on the supply and 
demand of the educated workers provides critical insights to the understanding of 
earnings inequality at the cross-sectional level, its explanatory power over the variability 
of the association over time and space has been shown somewhat limited since what have 
been actually variable along with the changing earnings distribution are not much of 
diverging earnings returns to education but of institutions, social norms, and political 
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power that ultimately define as well as alters the association between education and 
earnings.40 Given that it is clearly known that education is a significant determinant of 
earnings inequality, what has been left for further investigation is how the association is 
embedded in an institutional and organizational context and the extent to which the robust 
relationship between education and earnings inequality is moderated or modified by 
differential wage-setting institutional arrangements and social policies.    
 
 
 
                                           
40 If we are interested in the changing dynamics of household income, however, it would also be critical to 
consider changes in total household income, household member’s employment conditions, and family 
composition (Kenworthy 2007). 
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Chapter 3 
The Buffer Effect of Family Wealth over Economic Crisis: 
Realization of Its Consumption Potential When Indeed in Need 
 
 
Family wealth has long been recognized as a critical source of family well-being, 
social status, and political power: Not only does it provide its holders and sharers with 
short-term and long-term socioeconomic securities but also bestows significant life-time 
advantages in the achievement of further status and power, particularly at the critical 
junctures of life course. Although earned household income also delivers similar 
functions and effects to the economic well-being of household members, the possession 
of wealth offers extra – or, in a sense, more fundamental – socioeconomic security as a 
stock of resources that could be drawn whenever in need, as opposed to the flow of the 
earned income that could be cut in any occasion of economic distress such as unexpected 
unemployment or large-scale recession. As a better measure of family’s total resource 
base, therefore, wealth ownership is as much an important indicator as the earned income 
to the overall well-being and living standards of family members.   
Despite the significance of wealth ownership in family well-being, however, 
family wealth has less been the subject of social studies due to the lack of adequate data 
and its high level of concentration in the hands of the small population: The data that 
record wealth ownership, if any, have been sparse or incomprehensive, and the extremely 
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unequal distribution of wealth holdings renders its study less germane to the everyday life 
of the general public. In addition, most sociological studies have traditionally emphasized 
the role of labor market processes and rewards in the examination of economic well-
being, contributing to the dominance of the studies on education, occupation, and income 
over wealth. As a consequence, previous wealth studies were rather limited to the sketchy 
description of wealth holdings, and the discussion on the implications of wealth 
ownership also confined to elite studies for its significance in their life styles and social 
standings.   
This trend began to change with the advent of large-scale surveys and longitudinal 
studies in the last quarter of the twentieth century. As data collection on family wealth 
holdings has become more extensive and comprehensive, interests in the implications of 
wealth ownership for stratification and inequality have re-emerged. In addition, as the 
types of wealth holdings become more diversified in the industrial and post-industrial 
society, the possession of wealth has also become more widespread to the general public. 
Although the quantity and quality of wealth data is still not comprehensive enough to 
answer all the questions that social scientists have been able to throw to the study of labor 
market income, scholastic interests in family wealth have surged in recent decades, and 
accordingly, not only the descriptive contours of wealth holdings but the implications of 
wealth ownership for socio-behavioral outcomes have also become the targets of 
investigation. 
In this vein, I explore another implication of the wealth ownership for behavioral 
outcomes in this study, which has less been the subject of wealth studies compared to the 
descriptions and classifications of wealth. In particular, I examine the potential buffer 
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effect of family wealth on the level of household consumption over economic crisis. 
Since one of the most expected functionalities of wealth is its buffering effect against 
financially challenging times, if it does produce the effect as hypothesized, those who 
possess even very meager level of fungible family wealth could better attenuate the 
severity of economic difficulties than those who do not, precisely at the time when the 
extra help is most pronounced. Although household income would function similarly in 
this respect, the income derived from the labor market is more likely to be disrupted 
during economic crisis, thus having an extra source of income flow from the existing 
household assets would provide an additional, if not critical, cushion to the economic 
well-being of households during the challenging times. If family wealth indeed functions 
as a “consumption potential” stocked over regular times, its effect is to be most 
pronounced in the course of economic crisis when it is indeed in need.  
In order to empirically test these hypotheses, I draw on the decadal experience of 
South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Once one of the most praised 
exemplars of the state-led rapid economic development in the second half of the 
twentieth century (so-called the East Asian ‘developmental state’), South Korea 
experienced the sudden and most severe economic crisis in the late 1997 after the Korean 
War. Although the recession in the wake of the pan-Asian financial crisis was relatively 
short-lived and the Korean economy came back strong in a short period of time, most 
South Koreans and households tremendously suffered from the crisis and it substantially 
changed the dynamics and configurations of the economy and society accordingly. 
Against this context, I examine the extent to which family wealth mitigated the adverse 
impact of the economic crisis and evaluate how the effect of the possession of liquid 
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financial assets on household consumption changed over the course of economic recovery.  
In the next section, I first discuss the general significance of family wealth as 
“consumption potential” for household members and its working definition for this study. 
In the following section, I provide more detailed accounts of the backdrop of this study – 
South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – although I believe that the analytic 
strategies, results, and implications of this study can be easily extended to more general 
and similar socioeconomic contexts. Then the data, measures, and analytic methods used 
in this study are introduced before results are presented. In the concluding section, I 
highlight the results once again in order to shed some light on the implications of family 
wealth for the socio-behavioral outcomes of individuals and households in the study of 
social stratification and inequality. 
 
Family Wealth: Its Significance as Consumption Potential  
 
Family wealth has long been recognized as a critical, if not more fundamental, 
measure of overall economic well-being and living standards for family members who 
share it: Family wealth provides for both short- and long-term financial security, bestows 
social prestige, contributes to political power, and can be used to produce more wealth 
(Domhoff 1990; Henretta and Campbell 1978; Oliver and Shapiro 1995). However, as 
Spilerman (2000) points out, stratification research to date has been characterized by an 
almost exclusive focus on labor market processes and rewards (e.g. occupation and 
earnings) to the neglect of a consideration of wealth, unearned income, and consumption. 
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There exist various theoretical and empirical reasons why it has been so41, but the most 
critical factors have been 1) the lack of appropriate data and 2) the high-level of wealth 
concentration in the hands of few. Because income from labor market activities is more 
common source of financial basis for the majority of households, family wealth, which 
has traditionally been highly concentrated in the hands of the small population, has less 
been the subject of social research, and lack of comprehensive data on the details of 
family wealth holdings further rendered the study of wealth more challenging than other 
sources of incomes. As a consequence, most existing wealth studies are somewhat limited 
to the analysis of trends and compositions of family wealth rather than its potential 
effects for socio-behavioral outcomes of individuals or households, and even if so, the 
studies mostly focus on its role as a status symbol for distinct life styles and prestige 
(Kolko 1962; Mills 1956; Parkin 1971; Weber 1958). 
As both challenges have become eased over the last quarter century, however, 
researcher began to appreciate household asset holdings again for its implications for 
overall economic well-being and living standards of family members. Given that even 
modest level of wealth holdings may greatly influence economic well-being of the 
majority of population, we miss much of the big picture of the living standards and life 
chances of family members if we do not consider the impact of family wealth, which is 
somewhat independent of earned incomes from labor market activities. In particular, it is 
noteworthy that Spilerman recognizes the distinct contribution of household wealth to 
family member’s overall economic well-being as “consumption potential” that he defines  
as “the capacity of a family to maintain a particular standard of living” (Spilerman 
                                           
41 See Spilerman (2000) for reviews. 
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2000:497). This new conceptualization of family wealth is particularly significant, not 
only because it effectively shifts the orientation of economic well-being from individual-
oriented labor market processes to the household-based consumption potential for overall 
living standards, but it also sheds new light on the study of inequality and personal well-
being, which hitherto has been dominated by concerns over labor market processes and 
rewards. Although earnings and occupations are still critical for one’s socioeconomic 
well-being, the recognition of the significance of family well-being as consumption 
potential is also important if we are to better understand the multifaceted nature of 
personal well-being from a more holistic perspective. 
Given that both earned incomes from labor market and incomes generated from 
wealth holdings are equally critical to family members’ economic well-being on the 
similar ground, however, what are the additional benefits that come from the 
understanding of family wealth as consumption potential vis-à-vis labor market earnings? 
In addition, how can we operationalize the concept of consumption potential in order to 
empirically test its significance for personal well-being? Moreover, is there any specific 
period of time when the effect of family wealth is more pronounced as consumption 
potential? Before presenting the way I attempt to address these questions on an empirical 
ground, I first discuss the significance of family wealth in comparison to earned incomes 
and the working definition of family wealth used in this study. 
 
Family Wealth vs. Earned Income 
 
At the technical level, wealth has several attractive features that are not shared by 
 61 
 
earnings (Sherraden 1991; Spilerman, Lewin-Epstein, and Semyonov 1993): (a) The 
income generated by wealth does not require a tradeoff between leisure and work. (b) 
Unlike labor market earnings, the income flow generated by wealth does not decline with 
illness or unemployment. (c) Wealth can be enjoyed without being consumed, such as 
when held in the form of a fine painting or a drawing. (d) Tax law treats wealth 
appreciation more favorable than labor market income. (e) In time of economic crisis, the 
wealth principal can be consumed as well as used as collateral for borrowing. 
The benefits of wealth ownership, however, go beyond the technical advantages 
over labor market income – There are other advantages uniquely associated with wealth 
that income alone cannot provide. First, as a stock of resources that can be converted to 
cash flow when needed, the ownership of family wealth bestows extra benefits on its 
holders that is distinct from the regular advantages associated with the flow of earned 
income from labor market activities. Moreover, given that the correlation between earned 
income and wealth is relatively weak and wealth is more unequally distributed than 
income (Keister 2000; Wolff 2002), it is essential to investigate the dynamics of wealth 
independently from that of labor market income if we are to draw a complete picture of 
economic well-being of individuals and households.  
Second, unlike labor market income that could be highly subjective to external 
economic circumstances, family wealth provides its holders with both short- and long-
term financial/economic security (Keister and Moller 2000). While the flow of income 
can easily be disrupted when the unexpected economic dislocations, such as 
unemployment or recession, occur, the income generated from the stock of wealth can be 
easily drawn to complement the losses whenever in need. In this sense, the possession of 
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wealth is a better indicator of economic security and financial well-being than labor 
market income alone.  
Third, since family wealth resides in the unit of household as the reservoir of 
resources that can be drawn by any of individual members when in need of it, the amount 
of wealth holdings is also a better proxy of entire family members’ well-being than 
household income. Furthermore, family wealth is often utilized to sustain individual 
members’ life styles and opportunities within and across generations, and when 
substantial financial buttress is critical (e.g. college education, marriage, and housing 
down payment), it helps them make a smooth transition at those critical junctures of life 
course. In this sense, family wealth functions as “transformative assets” which give 
families the ability to transform their own lives and the lives of their children (Shapiro 
2004). While earned income is received and used from day to day to support daily living, 
wealth is received and used in families at important milestones in life to create 
opportunities and leverage advantages for the next generation (Johnson 2006; Keister 
2000; Oliver and Shapiro 1995).  
Lastly, not only does wealth provide family members with a physical/material 
safety net as explained so far, but it also gives them a psychological safety that income 
may or may not provide alone. With the possession of wealth, “peace of mind” or “a 
cushion for the future” can be present in family member’s psychological state (Johnson 
2006:115), and this psychological comfort also affects various socioeconomic behaviors 
of individuals and households, particularly with respect to the planning and consumption 
of their financial resources  (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981).  
In summary, the presence of household wealth is much more consequential to a 
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family’s living standard than can be conveyed by a simple calculation of the share it 
contributes to family income – While the income flow from labor market activities cover 
day-to-day expenses, such as rents and mortgages, the stock of wealth allows families 
goes beyond that. In this vein, I investigate another significant impact of wealth 
possession on family member’s well-being, which exemplifies the extra benefits of 
family wealth vis-à-vis labor market income: the buffer effect of family wealth on 
household consumption over economic crisis when the flow of labor market income is 
highly likely to be disrupted. Before explaining hypotheses and analytic strategies to test 
the buffering effect hypotheses, however, the measures of family wealth used for that 
purpose is first defined.  
 
Working Definition of Family Wealth and Hypotheses 
 
As I have briefly argued earlier, among the numerous potential implications of 
family wealth for socio-behavioral outcomes of households, I particularly focus on its 
consumption potential and examine how the consumption potential of wealth is actually 
realized in a specific context. Because family wealth is comprised of different types of 
assets and each type of assets functions differently in different settings, however, it is 
necessary to first define what it is and which component of the assets is to be the focal 
point of this study. In general, family wealth is defined as the amount of household net 
worth measured by total assets minus total liabilities: 
 
Family Wealth = Net Worth = Total Assets – Total Liabilities. 
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The total assets again can be subdivided into two broad categories, depending on the 
form it takes and the degree that it can be readily converted for cash flow: 1) financial 
assets (e.g. savings, stocks, and bonds) and 2) non-financial assets (e.g. housing, real 
estates, and vehicles). In the category of total liabilities, mortgages, car loans, student 
loans, and credit card debt account for most of the household debt.    
 Between the two types of household assets, financial assets that can be readily 
converted to instant cash flow when needed – i.e. liquid financial assets such as capital 
gains from housing and stock ownership – are the primary variable of interest in this 
study. In particular, by examining how the possession of the liquid financial assets affects 
household consumption behavior over the course of economic crisis differently from the 
ensuing period of stable economic growth, I aim to evaluate the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In the wake of economic crisis, liquid financial assets are to be 
drawn to protect the level of household consumption, working as a buffer against 
the adverse economic circumstances. In other words, the consumption potential of 
family wealth is to be realized – and most pronounced – at the time when it is 
indeed in need, such as economic crisis; 
 
Hypothesis 2: When the economic crisis ends and the economy is back to a stable 
period of growth, the buffer effect of the liquid financial assets is unnecessary so 
that the possession of liquid financial assets would not exert an extra effect on the 
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level of household consumption vis-à-vis earned household income. In this sense, 
family wealth goes back to the potential status as the economy stabilizes. 
 
 Although the possession of any type of family wealth would be beneficial to the 
economic well-being of households in economic crisis, I hypothesize that liquid financial 
assets would have more direct impacts on the level of household consumption, such as 
monthly living expenses, in the period of economic hardships since they are more 
fungible assets readily available for immediate use when needed. In addition, I expect the 
significance of family wealth as consumption potential to be most pronounced during the 
period of economically challenging times, and if it does produce the effect as 
hypothesized, those who possess even very meager amount of the financial wealth could 
better attenuate the severity of economic difficulties than those who do not. Moreover, 
even if household income would function similarly in this regard, the income derived 
from labor markets is more likely to be disrupted during economic crisis, thus having an 
extra source of income flow from the existing household assets would provide an 
additional, if not critical, cushion to the well-being of household members during the 
economically challenging times. In sum, if family wealth indeed functions as a 
“consumption potential,” which is stocked over regular times, its effect is expected to be 
most pronounced precisely at the time when the extra help is indeed in need.  
Before discussing the data, measures, and analytic methods that I utilize to 
empirically test these hypotheses, a brief introduction to the backdrop of this study – i.e. 
South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – follows first in the next section. 
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The Backdrop of Study: South Korea After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) – which started from Thailand in the 
summer of 1997, then swiftly spread to the rest of East Asian countries by the end of the 
same year – significantly debilitated most East and South East Asian economies at the 
time.42 Although the crisis was relatively short-lived, followed by a steady economic 
recovery across the region, the speed and magnitude of the Asia’s collective stumble, the 
erosion of the wealth, and the increases in poverty and social insecurity during the crisis 
were massive enough to be referred to as the regional equivalent of the Great Depression 
in the 1930s (Wade 1998a). South Korea, once praised as the exemplar of the 
developmental state (Woo-Cumings 1999) up to the crisis, was among the hardest hit by 
the financial crisis, suffering the worst economic recession since the Korean War in the 
early 1950s (See Table 6 for the extent to which household income and consumption was 
affected by the Asian Financial Crisis). Facing massive capital flight with its own foreign 
reserves rapidly running out, Korean banks and chaebols43 were unable to pay back 
international loans in time, and in the end, the government had to ask the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency bailouts so as not to confront the worst scenario of 
national bankruptcy.  
 
(Table 6 about here – Change in Income and Consumption in 1998) 
 
                                           
42 Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea were particularly hit hard by the crisis. 
 
43 Chaebols are the family-controlled large, diversified conglomerates that have played a key role in the 
industrial development of South Korea, particularly after 1960s. 
 
 67 
 
As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 7, however, overall macroeconomic 
indicators, such as annual economic growth rates and unemployment rates, began to 
rebound as early as late 1998 and continuously improved until the recent global financial 
crisis in 2008 (See Table 2 and Figure 7 below for details).   
 
(Table 2 about here – Principle Economic Indicators) 
 
(Figure 7 about here – Macroeconomic Performance) 
 
Against this context, I divide post-crisis South Korea into two periods in order to 
empirically test the hypotheses advanced in this study: one for the period of economic 
recovery (between 1997 and 2001) and the other for the period of sustained economic 
growth (between 2001 and 2006). 44 Then I compare and contrast how the effect of 
household liquid financial assets on household consumption differs in the two periods of 
different economic conditions. 
 
Analysis on the Trajectories of Household Consumption by Family Wealth in Post-
AFC South Korea (1997-2006) 
 
Data and Analytic Sample 
 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) is the most comprehensive 
                                           
44  Note that the Korean economy suffered most from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, recovered to 
the pre-crisis level in 2001 when South Korea also paid off all the international debts, and began to grow 
again since then. 
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longitudinal survey that contains various information on the Korean labor market and 
related socioeconomic activities of households and individuals residing in the urban areas 
of South Korea (Korea Labor Institute 2009). Benchmarking the success of other 
nationally representative panel surveys, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in 
the U.S., the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) launched its first wave of KLIPS in year 1998 
with a sample of 5000 households and their 13,321 household members, who are 15 years 
or above, and has continuously tracked the initial samples and branched households on an 
annual basis.45 The original sample of the households was selected by a two-stage 
stratified cluster sampling (random choice of urban households within the Korean Census 
enumeration districts), and the data are principally collected by a direct face-to-face 
interview comprised of separate questionnaires for the household and its all individual 
members aged 15 and above. As of 2011, fourteenth wave of data collection is being 
conducted, and the household and individual datasets from wave 1 through 11 are readily 
available on the Korea Labor Institute website for public use.46 
The major topics of the KLIPS cover both household characteristics (e.g. 
household composition, housing information, and financial condition) and individual 
socioeconomic activities particularly related to labor market (e.g. employment, education, 
income, job training, working conditions and welfare, etc.) with occasional supplemental 
surveys for specific demographic groups. Since the primary goal of this study is to follow 
and model the patterns of household consumption (e.g. household monthly living 
expenses) by the possession of family wealth in post-crisis South Korea, the analytic 
                                           
45 The original household retention rate is 75.5% by wave 10, which is comparable to other highly regarded 
national panel studies such as the U.S. PSID, the British BHPS, and the German GSOEP. 
 
46 Visit http://www.kli.re.kr/kli_ehome/main/main.jsp for the details. 
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sample for this study is limited to households with over zero monthly living expenses, 
which results in 6359 households with 35243 household-year observations from the first 
ten waves of the KLIPS (1997-2006). 
 
Measures 
 
 The dependent variable of this study is the logged household’s average monthly 
living expenses, and the primary independent variable is the possession of liquid financial 
assets (Yes/No). In addition, total household income, number of household members, 
home ownership, household savings and debt are also included as controls in a successive 
modeling procedure. The descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized in Table 7 
for 1997 – 2006. 
 
(Table 7 about here – Variables and Descriptive Statistics by Year) 
 
 
 Analytic Method: The Multilevel Model for Change 
 
I employ a set of regression analysis in order to empirically test the association 
between the level of household consumption and family wealth holdings and how the 
relationship varies with external economic conditions. In particular, the Multilevel Model 
for Change (Singer and Willett 2003) is adapted to model the changing trajectories of 
household monthly living expenses in post-AFC South Korea by the possession of liquid 
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financial assets, net of confounding factors, such as total household income and debt, that 
potentially influence the association between the household living expenses and liquid 
financial assets.  
As a special case of the general multilevel modeling approach47, the Multilevel 
Model for Change (the MMC) is widely used to model subject’s changing trajectories on 
a certain outcome over time (i.e. intra-subject change over time) in relation to a set of 
explanatory variables that capture systematic patterns across the individual trajectories 
(i.e. inter-subject differences in change).48 In other words, the intra-subject change over 
time is modeled as a function of clocking time at the ‘base’ level (or level-1), then the 
individual change trajectories themselves are modeled as a function of explanatory 
variables at a higher level (or level-2) in order to explain the variability in the individual 
change trajectories at the level-1. To implement the MMC, therefore, panel data with 
multiple observations on the same subject over time are essential in that the within-
subject observations across time become the source for modeling at the level-1, and once 
the individual trajectories are estimated, the estimates from the level-1 in turn are 
modeled as a function of individual characteristics at the level-2.49 With these multilevel 
data and modeling structures, the MMC is utilized primarily to answer two broad 
                                           
47 With multiple competing terms, such as hierarchical models, random-effects or random-coefficient 
models, and mixed-effects models, the multilevel models are extensions of regression in which 
observations (level-1 data points) are nested in groups (level-2 clusters) and the parameters – the regression 
coefficients – can vary by group with a given probability model. See Fitzmaurice et al (2004), Gelman and 
Hill (2007), Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008), and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for further details. 
 
48 There exist many other convincing names for this particular statistical method, such as Hierarchical 
Linear Models, random-coefficients models, mixed-effects models, or growth curve analysis, but I prefer 
this term, the Multilevel Model for Change, since it better reflects the aims and nature of this study both at 
the empirical and theoretical level. 
 
49 Although the KLIPS is an unbalanced dataset with missing observations for some households in some 
years, the MMC is not affected as long as enough observations are contained in other observations. 
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questions: 1) How does the outcome change over time (i.e. within-subject change over 
time); 2) Can we predict the difference in these changes (i.e. inter-subject differences in 
change)? As expected, the first question can be answered with the level-1 sub-model 
while the second one with the level-2 sub-model. 
With this two-level structure of the data and analysis in mind, what I primarily 
aim to model in this study is the trajectories of household living expenses by the 
possession of liquid financial assets between 1997 and 2006, using both the level-1 and 
level-2 observations and variables. First, at the level-1, I simply model the within-
household expense trajectories as a function of time with household-year observations, 
allowing the rate of change to vary from one household to another (See equation (3) 
below). Note that, however, we use a linear spline function – instead of one straight line 
or a quadratic curve – in modeling the household expense trajectories between 1997 and 
2006 because I have strong theoretical and empirical reasons that support the trajectories 
of household living expenses substantially changed around 2001.50 As can be seen in 
equation (3), the two separate linear regression lines are split and adjoined in 2001 to 
reflect the two potentially different trends in post-crisis South Korea: 
 
 ln Yit = π0i +π1iPre2001t + π2iPost2001t + εit (3)  
   
 π0i = γ00 + δ0i (4)  
                                           
50 The Korean economy suffered the most from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, recovered to the 
pre-crisis level in 2001, and began to grow again since then. Thus it seems logical to divide the post-crisis 
Korean economy into the two periods where the dynamics of household income and expenses changed 
accordingly around 2001. 
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 π1i = γ10 + δ1i (5)  
 π2i = γ20 + δ2i (6)  
 
where  ln Yit = the natural log of household i’s mean monthly living expenses in year t51; Pre2001t = the first part of the linear spline function representing year 1997-
200152; Post2001t = the second part of the linear spline function representing year 
2001-2006; 
εit = the stochastic disturbance of the household i in year t; 
and 
π0i = the expected logged living expenses of household i in year 1997 – or an 
individual intercept – which is a function of the grand mean across 
households, γ00, and individual random effect, δ0i; 
π1i = the rate of change in household i’s logged living expenses between 1997 
and 2001 which is a function of grand mean across households, γ10, and 
individual household random effect δ1i; 
π2i = the rate of change in household i’s logged expensed between 2001 and 
2006 which is a function of grand mean across households, γ20, and 
individual household random effect δ2i. 
                                           
51 The size distribution of variables such as earnings and living expenses tend to be skewed, and 
logarithmic transformations of such variables reduce both skewness and heteroscedasticity. In addition, 
interpretation is convenient for variables like earnings and living expenses. 
 
52 Year variables do not have the subscript i because the KLIPS is a times-structured panel dataset in which 
data collection schedules does not vary across subjects. 
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In sum, this level-1 component of the multilevel model, also known as the individual 
growth model, represents the change in average monthly living expenses we expect each 
household to experience during the time period under study. In estimating the parameters 
through the Maximum Likelihood Estimation, I additionally assume that;  
 
1) 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is independently and normally distributed with a mean of 0 and constant 
variance, 𝜎𝜀2; 
2) the vectors of random errors at level-2 (i.e. 𝛿0𝑖, 𝛿1𝑖, and 𝛿2𝑖) are multivariate 
normal, each with a mean of 0, same variance (𝜎02, 𝜎12, and 𝜎22 respectively) and 
covariance among the random elements; 
3) the errors at level-1 and level-2 are also independent; 
4) the predictors at each level are not correlated with the random effects at the other 
level. 
 
We can also represent the same level-1 model in the composite form: 
 
 ln Yit = (γ00 + δ0i) + (γ10 + δ1i)Pre2001t + (γ20 + δ2i)Post2001t + εit; (7)  
   
 
ln Yit = [γ00 + γ10Pre2001t + γ20Post2001t] + 
         [δ0i + δ1iPre2001t + δ2iPost2001t + εit], (8)  
 
where equation (4), (5), and (6) are inserted into equation (3) in place of π0i, π1i, and π2i 
respectively. As can be seen in equation (8), after the rearrangement of the terms in 
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equation (7), the terms in the first bracket represent a structural part (or fixed effects) of 
the baseline model while those in the second bracket a stochastic part (or random effects). 
Also note that the year variables are centered so that the intercept term represents 
household i’s expected logged living expenses in year 1997. 
 Next, at the level-2, I pool the information from the level-1 analysis – i.e. 
variations in the rate of household living expense changes (or random coefficients for 
each household) – in order to model the inter-household differences in the living expense 
trajectories (or individual household coefficients) with covariates. If the goal of the level-
1 analysis with equation (3) is to describe the shape of each household’s living expenses 
growth (or decline) trajectory over time, the objective of the level-2 analysis is to detect 
heterogeneity in change across households as well as to determine the relationship 
between the shape of each household’s living expenses trajectory and a series of 
independent variables, such as the possession of liquid financial assets. Equation (9) 
below represents the composite model with both the level-1 and level-2 variables and 
estimates combined: 
 
 
ln Yit = � �γ00 + �γ0jTVCitj
j
+ �γ0kTICik
k
�
+  �γ10 + �γ1jTVCitj
j
+ �γ1kTICik
k
�Pre2001t
+ �γ20 + �γ2jTVCitj
j
+ �γ2kTICik
k
�Post2001t� 
+ [δ0i + δ1iPre2001t + δ2iPost2001t + εit], 
(9)  
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where TVC represents a set of time-varying covariates and TIC a set of time-invariant 
covariates, both of which vary across different models.53 Once again, with this composite 
model that combines the level-1 and level-2 sub-model, we can not only investigate the 
within-household variations of living expenses over time but also model and explain the 
inter-household differences in the trajectories with various covariates.  
 
Results 
 
The results of the four different MMC models are presented and summarized in 
Table 8 below.  
 
(Table 8 about here – Results of the MMC) 
 
 In Model 1, in which only equation (3) is estimated (i.e. the trajectories of 
individual household living expenses between 1997 and 2006 with a linear spline 
function), we can see that the rate of change in the household living expenses increases 
faster between 1997 and 2001 than between 2001 and 2006 as hypothesized (0.1036 and 
0.0894 respectively). In Model 2, the primary variable of interest in this study – the 
possession of liquid financial assets – is added to Model 1 in order to examine the 
significance of liquid financial assets in household living expenses. The result shows that 
the possession of liquid financial assets has a significantly positive effect on the level of 
                                           
53 Because it is inconvenient to represent time-varying covariates in the separate hierarchical equations as 
in equation (3) – (6), only the composite form is presented here. Also note that the TVC terms have a 
subscript t to denote that the TVC’s vary across time while TIC’s do not. 
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household living expenses, and on average, those households that possess any type of 
liquid financial assets tend to spend 6.38% more for monthly living expenses than those 
who do not.54 In Model 3, the rest of socio-demographic variables – the total household 
income, number of household members, home ownership, savings, and debt – are 
included to measure their independent effects on household living expenses as well as to 
test the robustness of the association observed in Model 2 net of these socio-demographic 
variables. As much expected, the effects of total household income, number of household 
members, and home ownership all have significantly positive effects on the level of 
household living expenses, and the effect of liquid financial assets on household living 
expenses observed in Model 2 still appears robust even after accounting for these socio-
demographic variables.  
 Model 4, which is the final model, includes all the variables in Model 3 and their 
interaction terms with the year spline function that divides post-crisis South Korea into 
two periods as defined earlier. In this model, the significance of all the variables included 
in Model 3 is preserved as they are except for the effect of household financial debt: Its 
effect appears significantly positive in Model 3 while the sign of the effect has switched 
to negative in Model 4. The most significant part of this model for this study, however, is 
the direction and significance of the interaction terms.55 First, the effect of total 
household income is as expected: Additional household income has a positive effect on 
the rate of change in household living expenses throughout the period although its effect 
                                           
54 Interpretation of the coefficient in terms of percentage = (ecoefficient – 1)*100 = (e0.0619 – 1)*100 = 
0.0638*100 = 6.38 (%) 
 
55 Note that the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms denote the effect of the respective variables 
on the rate of change in household living expenses over the period, not the absolute effect of each variable 
on the level of household living expenses which is represented in the coefficients of the main terms in the 
same model.  
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is more pronounced during the period of economic recovery (0.0037 for 1997-2001) than 
in the period of a stable economic growth (0.0003 for 2001-2006). Second, although not 
as clear as the effect of household income, the effects of household savings and debt are 
also interpretable: Households tend to spend savings to weather the adverse impact of 
economic crisis over the period of economic recovery (0.0042 for 1997-2001) and begins 
to save again when the economy starts to grow (-0.0003 for 2001-2006). In the similar 
vein, the effect of household debt on the rate of change in household living expenses is 
positive over the first period (0.0188 for 1997-2001) and becomes negligible in the 
second period since people tend to borrow more when the economy is still in a recovery 
stage. Lastly, but most importantly for this study, the effects of the possession of liquid 
financial on the rate of change in household living expenses over the period: At first 
glance, it seems perplexing because the sign of the coefficients of the two interaction 
terms appear reversed – the effect of the liquid financial assets has a significantly 
negative impact on the rate of change in household living expenses over the recovery 
period (-0.007 for 1997-2001) while it has a positive but not significant effect in the 
period of the stable economic growth. If the coefficients of the interaction terms are 
examined in line with my hypotheses for this study, however, they are not as much 
perplexing as they appear. Throughout this study, I hypothesize that the effect of the 
possession of liquid financial assets would be most pronounced at the time of economic 
crisis if it has indeed the consumption potential for weathering out difficult times; and 
according to this hypothesis, its effect should appear strongest at the time of economic 
crisis and could diminish as the economy recovers. The estimated coefficients of liquid 
financial assets in Model 4 indeed show this pattern in that its effect on the level of 
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household living expenses appears strongest at the time of the economic crisis among the 
included economic variables (0.0791, the coefficient of the main-effect term for 1997), 
became less pronounced as the economy substantially recovered between 1997 and 2001, 
and finally became negligible on the rate of change in household living expenses when 
the economy is back to the period of stable growth after 2001. These empirical results, 
therefore, not only support the hypotheses that I set up to test the consumption potential 
of liquid financial assets but also clarify the pattern of the utilization of the wealth 
whether it is most utilized when indeed in need.  
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Drawing on the decadal experience of South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, I have examined the effect of family wealth on household consumption in the 
wake of economic crisis in order to test the potential buffer effect of family wealth on the 
economic well-being of households against economically challenging times. Among the 
numerous socio-behavioral implications of wealth ownership, I have paid particular 
attention to its consumption potential as defined by Spilerman (2000) and conducted a set 
of empirical analyses to see if the consumption potential of family wealth is indeed 
realized as expected when households are most in need of it – the period of economic 
crisis. In other words, if family wealth – particularly liquid financial assets that can be 
readily converted to cash flow when in need – functions as consumption potential that is 
stocked over regular times to be used to buffer against the adverse impact of economic 
crisis, households who possess any type of liquid financial assets are naturally to draw 
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the resources to sustain their consumption level at the time of economic crisis and stop 
drawing when the extra resources become unnecessary as the economy recovers from 
crisis.  
The results of statistical analysis based on household panel data and the multilevel 
model for change support this hypothesis, showing that the effect of liquid financial 
assets on the level of household consumptions is the strongest at the time of economic 
crisis, diminishes as the economy recovers to the pre-crisis level, and becomes negligible 
when the economy starts to grow and the regular sources of household income – earned 
income from labor market activities – flow back to households again. According to these 
results, therefore, family wealth indeed provides extra cushion to the economic well-
being of households independent of earned household income, and its effect as 
consumption potential is most heightened when it is indeed in need. 
However, since this study focuses only on the effects of within-household asset 
holdings, not accounting for inter-household asset transfers, the dynamics of family 
wealth and consumption observed in this study may be altered once the inter-household 
asset transfers are included in the models. Furthermore, it would be also intriguing to 
investigate potential interaction effects between family wealth and household income on 
consumption. For instance, I have only examined independent effects of liquid financial 
assets and household income on the level of household monthly living expenses in this 
study without allowing interaction effects between the two independent variables; but if 
they are further examined with a different statistical model particularly devised to test the 
interaction effects, interesting patterns of relationship between wealth and income on 
consumption are likely to emerge, which merits further investigation.  
 80 
 
Lastly, the buffer effect of liquid financial assets on household consumption in the 
course of economic crisis is only one dimension of the consumption potential that the 
ownership of family wealth implies: As a better measure of overall economic well-being 
and living standards for family members than the flow of earned income alone, family 
wealth would not only provide this type of temporary buffering effect against 
economically challenging times but it would also have more substantial impacts on other 
socioeconomic dimensions with longer-term implications. Given that even meager level 
of family asset holdings have a significant impact on the economic well-being of 
households, further investigation into the dynamics of family wealth in conjunction with 
labor market income would surely enrich the study of socioeconomic behaviors of 
individuals and households. 
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Chapter 4 
Marital Status and Life Satisfaction under Economic Hardships 
 
 
Numerous studies have attested various benefits of marriage on individual’s 
physical and emotional well-being: Married people not only tend to live longer than the 
non-married but they also stay physically and emotionally healthier throughout their 
lifetime (Coombs 1991; Dush, Taylor, and Rhiannon 2008; Lee, Seccombe, and Shehan 
1991). Although there exist competing hypotheses in the explanation of the “marriage 
premium”, such as selection versus protection/support (Stutzer and Frey 2006), the 
positive effects of marriage on personal well-being are considered almost universal across 
time and location (Glenn and Weaver 1988; Stack and Eshleman 1998).  
However, does the “marriage premium” remain unchallenged during the period 
of severe economic hardships? In particular, would married people still report higher 
level of life satisfaction than the non-married even under severe economic hardships such 
as economic crisis? If the protective effect of marriage still functions positive even at the 
time of economic crisis, the married would report higher level of life satisfaction than the 
non-married; but since it is also likely that married people would feel more burdens and 
pressures about their family during economic hardships, this may diminish or nullify the 
positive protective effect of marriage on life satisfaction observed at regular times. 
Furthermore, when most people report a higher level of life satisfaction as the economy 
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recovers from crisis, do the responses of the married show a different pattern from the 
rest of people? Although it seems reasonable to assume that married people would show a 
higher rate of change in life satisfaction in the course of economic recovery, it is also 
equally likely that the rate of change of the married would not be much different from the 
rest of groups – or may be lower than the rest of groups – if the marriage premium 
already worked positive at the time of economic crisis. Based on these theories and 
assumptions, I primarily aim to test following two hypotheses in this study:   
 
Hypothesis 1: If the marriage premium still works positive even under severe 
economic hardships, the married would report higher level of life satisfaction than 
the non-married at the time of economic crisis after accounting for known 
covariates. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As the economy recovers from economic crisis, however, the rate 
of change in the level of life satisfaction of the married in the course of economic 
recovery would not be much different from – or may be lower than – the rest of 
people if the supposed marriage premium on life satisfaction already worked 
positive at the time of economic crisis. 
 
In order to empirically test these two hypotheses regarding marital status and the 
level of life satisfaction under economic hardships, I draw on the experience of South 
Korea between 1998 and 2001 when South Korea suffered most from the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and recuperated to the pre-crisis level by the end of the period. Based on 
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the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (1998-2001) and three different sets of 
regression analyses56, I first analyze the cross-sectional association between marital 
status and life satisfaction in year 1998 to address the first hypothesis then investigate the 
potentially differential trajectories of the level of life satisfaction by marital status 
between 1998 and 2001 in order to address the second hypothesis of this study. Before I 
discuss the details of the data, measures, and analytic methods, the backdrop of this study 
– South Korea in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – is briefly introduced to 
contextualize the empirical analyses. 
 
The Backdrop of Study: South Korea in the Wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
(1998-2001) 
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) – which started from Thailand in the 
summer of 1997, then swiftly spread to the rest of East Asian countries by the end of the 
same year – significantly debilitated most East and South East Asian economies at the 
time.57 Although the crisis was relatively short-lived, followed by a steady economic 
recovery across the region, the speed and magnitude of the Asia’s collective stumble, the 
erosion of the wealth, and the increases in poverty and social insecurity during the crisis 
were massive enough to be referred to as the regional equivalent of the Great Depression 
in the 1930s (Wade 1998a). South Korea, once praised as the exemplar of the 
developmental state (Woo-Cumings 1999) up to the crisis, was among the hardest hit by 
                                           
56 Multiple linear regression model and a cumulative logit model for ordinal outcomes is used for the first 
hypothesis while the multilevel model for change is utilized for the second hypothesis. 
 
57 Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea were particularly hit hard by the crisis. 
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the financial crisis, suffering the worst economic recession since the Korean War in the 
early 1950s. Facing massive capital flight with its own foreign reserves rapidly running 
out, Korean banks and chaebols58 were unable to pay back international loans in time, 
and in the end, the government had to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
emergency bailouts so as not to confront the worst scenario of national bankruptcy.  
As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 7, however, overall macroeconomic 
indicators, such as annual economic growth rates and unemployment rates, began to 
rebound as early as late 1998 and continuously improved until the recent global financial 
crisis in 2008.   
 
(Table 2 about here – Principle Economic Indicators) 
 
(Figure 7 about here – Macroeconomic Performance of South Korea) 
 
In testing my hypotheses advanced in this study, however, I focus on 1) year 1998 when 
South Korea suffered most from the AFC and 2) the following three years of substantial 
economic recovery (1998-2001) in which the Korean economy completely recovered to 
the pre-crisis level while also paying off all the international debt from the 1997 AFC.59  
 
 
                                           
58 Chaebols are the family-controlled large, diversified conglomerates that have played a key role in the 
industrial development of South Korea, particularly after 1960s. 
 
59 The Korean economy suffered most from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, recovered to the pre-
crisis level in 2001, and began to grow again since then. 
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Marital Status and Life Satisfaction in Post-AFC South Korea (1998-2001) 
 
Data and Analytic Sample 
 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) is the most comprehensive 
longitudinal survey that contains various information on the Korean labor market and 
related socioeconomic activities of households and individuals residing in the urban areas 
of South Korea (Korea Labor Institute 2009). Benchmarking the success of other 
nationally representative panel surveys, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in 
the U.S., the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) launched its first wave of KLIPS in year 1998 
with a sample of 5000 households and their 13,321 household members, who are 15 years 
or above, and has continuously tracked the initial samples and branched households on an 
annual basis.60 The original sample of the households was selected by a two-stage 
stratified cluster sampling (random choice of urban households within the Korean Census 
enumeration districts), and the data are principally collected by a direct face-to-face 
interview comprised of separate questionnaires for the household and its all individual 
members aged 15 and above. As of 2011, fourteenth wave of data collection is being 
conducted, and the household and individual datasets from wave 1 through 11 are readily 
available on the Korea Labor Institute website for public use.61 
The major topics of the KLIPS cover both household characteristics (e.g. 
household composition, housing information, and financial condition) and individual 
                                           
60 The original household retention rate is 75.5% by wave 10, which is comparable to other highly regarded 
national panel studies such as the U.S. PSID, the British BHPS, and the German GSOEP. 
 
61 Visit http://www.kli.re.kr/kli_ehome/main/main.jsp for the details. 
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socioeconomic activities particularly related to labor market (e.g. employment, education, 
income, job training, working conditions and welfare, etc.) with occasional supplemental 
surveys for specific demographic groups. In addition, it also collects on various measures 
of subjective well-being such as the reported level of life satisfaction. In this study, 
13,112 individuals with 39,573 person-year observations between 1998 and 2001 (Wave 
1–4) are used as the analytic sample for statistical modeling. 
 
Measures 
 
 The dependent variable of this study is the respondent’s self-rated level of life 
satisfaction62, and the primary independent variable is respondent’s marital status 
categorized into five groups (never married, married, separated, divorced, and widowed). 
In addition, respondent’s age, sex, health status, education, employment status, household 
income, and marriage length are included as controls in a successive modeling procedure 
(Stutzer and Frey 2006). The descriptive statistics of these variables are summarized in 
Table 9 for 1998-2001. 
 
(Table 9 here – Variables and Descriptive Statistics by Year) 
 
 
Analytic Methods: Three Regression Models  
 
                                           
62 Respondent’s self-rated report on the question, “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your 
current life on a scale of 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied)?” 
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1) Testing the First Hypothesis: Multiple Linear Regression Model and Cumulative 
Logit Model for Ordered Outcomes 
 
First, the multiple linear regression model (Fox 2008) is used to address the first 
hypothesis of this study – “Would married people still report higher level of life 
satisfaction than the non-married even under severe economic hardships such as 
economic crisis?” In particular, based only on the 1998 KLIPS data – the first wave of the 
four used for this study – the statistical association between marital status and the self-
reported level of life satisfaction is tested with a series of multiple linear regression 
models controlling for known covariates:    
 
 
 Yi =  β0 +∑ βjMSijj + ∑ βkCOVikk + εi, (10)  
 
where  Yi = respondent i’s reported level of life satisfaction in year 1998; MSij = respondent i’s marital status in year 199863; COVik = a set of covariates, such as respondent’s age, sex, health, education, 
employment status, household income, and marriage length, that vary 
across different models; 
εi = the stochastic disturbance of the individual i in year 1998. 
                                           
63 Since the marital status variable contains five nominal categories with “never married” as the reference 
category in this analysis, four indicator variables for the rest of the categories (i.e. married, separated, 
divorced, and widowed) are included in the actual equation and estimation (indexed with j). 
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Then the results of the multiple linear regression models are to be compared and 
complemented with those from a cumulative logit model for ordered outcomes with the 
same set of variables in order to confirm that the limited nature of the dependent variable 
– which ranges only from 1 to 5 with potentially uneven intervals in-between – do not 
actually affect the substantial interpretation of the results from the multiple linear 
regression models estimated with equation (10) (Agresti 2002; Long 1997; Powers and 
Xie 2000). The cumulative logit model for ordered outcomes is estimated with:  
 
 
 ln Pr(yi ≤ j|𝐱i)Pr(yi > j|𝐱i) = τj −  𝐱i𝛃        for j = 1, J − 1 (11)  
 
where  
τj = a cutpoint for group j, which denotes different groups of marital status 
here64; 
𝐱i𝛃  = ∑ βjMSijj + ∑ βkCOVikk ; 
 
and the rest of notations is the same as in equation (10). 
 
2) Testing the Second Hypothesis: The Multilevel Model for Change 
 
After testing the first hypothesis with the multiple linear regression models and 
                                           
64 In this analysis, the ordered logit model is identified by assuming that the intercept is 0, and the values of 
all cutpoints are estimated. 
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the cumulative logit model, I use the Multilevel Model for Change (Singer and Willett 
2003) to test if the rate of change in the level of life satisfaction differs by marital status 
during the period of economic recovery in post-crisis South Korea between 1998 and 
2001. The set of variables included in this model is the same as those variables included 
in the previous analysis, but it has extra interaction terms between respondent’s marital 
status and year, which is necessary to address the second hypothesis: “When most people 
report a higher level of life satisfaction as the economy recovers from crisis, do the 
responses of the married show a different pattern from the non-married?” 
As a special case of the general multilevel modeling approach65, the Multilevel 
Model for Change (the MMC) is widely used to model subject’s changing trajectories on 
a certain outcome over time (i.e. intra-subject change over time) in relation to a set of 
explanatory variables that capture systematic patterns across the individual trajectories 
(i.e. inter-subject differences in change).66 In other words, the intra-subject change over 
time is modeled as a function of clocking time at the ‘base’ level (or level-1), then the 
individual change trajectories themselves are modeled as a function of the explanatory 
variables at a higher level (or level-2) in order to explain the variability in the individual 
change trajectories at the level-1. To implement the MMC, therefore, panel data with 
multiple observations on the same subject over time are essential in that the within-
                                           
65 With multiple competing terms, such as hierarchical models, random-effects or random-coefficient 
models, and mixed-effects models, the multilevel models are extensions of regression in which 
observations (level-1 data points) are nested in groups (level-2 clusters) and the parameters – the regression 
coefficients – can vary by group with a given probability model. See Fitzmaurice et al (2004), Gelman and 
Hill (2007), Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008), and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for further details. 
 
66 There exist many other convincing names for this particular statistical method, such as Hierarchical 
Linear Models, random-coefficients models, mixed-effects models, or growth curve analysis, but I prefer 
this term, the Multilevel Model for Change, since it better reflects the aims and nature of this study both at 
the empirical and theoretical level. 
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subject observations across time become the source for modeling at the level-1, and once 
the individual trajectories are estimated, the estimates from the level-1 in turn are 
modeled as a function of individual characteristics at the level-2.67 With these multilevel 
data and modeling structures, the MMC is utilized primarily to answer two broad 
questions: 1) How does the outcome change over time (i.e. within-subject change over 
time); 2) Can we predict the difference in these changes (i.e. inter-subject differences in 
change)? As expected, the first question can be answered with the level-1 sub-model 
while the second one with the level-2 sub-model. 
With this two-level structure of the data and analysis in mind, what I primarily 
aim to model in this study is the trajectories of individual level of life satisfaction by 
marital status between 1998 and 2001, using both the level-1 and level-2 observations 
and variables. First, at the level-1, I simply model the within-individual life satisfaction 
trajectories as a function of time with person-year observations, allowing the rate of 
change to vary from one individual to another: 
 
 Yit = π0i +π1iYeart + εit (12)  
 π0i = γ00 + δ0i (13)  
 π1i = γ10 + δ1i (14)  
 
where  Yit = respondent i’s reported level of life satisfaction in year t; 
                                           
67 Although the KLIPS is an unbalanced dataset with missing observations for some households in some 
years, the MMC is not affected as long as enough observations are contained in other observations. 
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Yeart = a continuous variable representing year 1998 – 200168; 
εit = the stochastic disturbance of the individual i in year t; 
and 
π0i = the expected level of life satisfaction of individual i in year 1998 – or the 
individual intercept i in 1998 – which is a function of the grand mean 
across individuals, γ00, and individual random effect, δ0i; 
π1i = the rate of change in individual i’s level of life satisfaction between 1998 
and 2001 which is a function of grand mean across individuals, γ10, and 
individual household random effect δ1i; 
 
In sum, this level-1 component of the multilevel model, also known as the individual 
growth model, represents the change in average level of life satisfaction we expect each 
individual to experience during the time period under study. In estimating the parameters 
through the Maximum Likelihood Estimation, I additionally assume that;  
 
1) 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is independently and normally distributed with a mean of 0 and constant 
variance, 𝜎𝜀2; 
2) the vectors of random errors at level-2 (i.e. 𝛿0𝑖 and 𝛿1𝑖) are multivariate normal, 
each with a mean of 0, same variance (𝜎02 and 𝜎12 respectively) and covariance 
among the random elements; 
3) the errors at level-1 and level-2 are also independent; 
4) the predictors at each level are not correlated with the random effects at the other 
                                           
68 Year variables do not have the subscript i because the KLIPS is a times-structured panel dataset in which 
data collection schedules does not vary across subjects. 
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level. 
 
We can also represent the same leve-1 model in the composite form: 
 
 Yit = (γ00 + δ0i) + (γ10 + δ1i)Yeart + εit (15)  
 Yit = [γ00 + γ10Yeart] + [δ0i + δ1iYeart +εit] (16)  
 
where the equation (13) and (14) are inserted into equation (12) in place of π0i and π1i 
respectively. As can be seen in equation (16), after the rearrangement of the terms in 
equation (15), the terms in the first bracket represent a structural part (or fixed effects) of 
the baseline model while those in the second bracket a stochastic part (or random effects). 
Also note that the year variables are centered so that the intercept term represents 
individual i’s expected level of life satisfaction in year 1998. 
 Next, at the level-2, I pool the information from the level-1 analysis – i.e. 
variations in the rate of changes in individual life satisfaction (or random coefficients for 
each individual) – in order to model the inter-individual differences in the level of life 
satisfaction (or individual coefficients) with covariates. If the goal of the level-1 analysis 
with equation (12) is to describe the shape of each individual’s life satisfaction growth (or 
decline) trajectory over time, the objective of the level-2 analysis is to detect 
heterogeneity in change across individuals as well as to determine the relationship 
between the shape of each individual’s life satisfaction trajectory and a series of 
independent variables, such as respondent’s marital status. Equation (17) below 
represents the composite model with both the level-1 and level-2 variables and estimates 
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combined: 
 
 
Yit = � �γ00 + �γ0pTVCitp
p
+ �γ0qTICiq
q
�
+  �γ10 + �γjMSitj
j
�Yeart�  
+ [δ0i + δ1iYeart +εit], 
(17)  
 
where TVC represents a set of time-varying covariates (e.g. health status) and TIC a set 
of time-invariant covariates (e.g. sex), both of which vary across different models.69 With 
this composite model that combines the level-1 and level-2 model, we can not only 
investigate the within-individual variations of life satisfaction over time but also model 
and explain the inter-individual differences in the trajectories with various covariates, 
such as marital status.  
 
Results 
 
First, the result of the multiple linear regression models and the cumulative logit 
model are presented and summarized in Table 10.  
 
(Table 10 about here – Results of the MLR and CLM) 
                                           
69 Because it is inconvenient to represent time-varying covariates in the separate hierarchical equations as 
in equation (12) – (14), only the composite form is presented here. Also note that the TVC terms have a 
subscript t to denote that the TVC’s vary across time while TIC’s do not. 
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 In Model 1, only the association between the reported level of life satisfaction – 
the dependent variable – and individual’s marital status – the primary variable of interest 
– in year 1998 is estimated without covariates. The results appear somewhat surprising in 
that the married report significantly lower level of life satisfaction than the never married 
(the reference category, omitted) at the time of the severe economic crisis in 1998. 
However, as can be seen in the subsequent model, Model 2, once we control for basic 
demographic variables, such as age, sex, and health status, the association observed in 
Model 1 changes back to the one well aligned with the existing literature on marriage 
premium70: Married people reported higher level of life satisfaction than the rest of 
groups, including the never married, separated, divorced, and widowed, and the 
association stays robust even after accounting for other known covariates such as 
education, employment status, household income (Model 3), and marriage length (Model 
4-1). In addition, because the outcomes of this series of the multiple linear regression 
models are exactly replicated in the cumulative logit model (Model 4-2) both in terms of 
direction and significance, the results of the final model with all known covariates 
(Model 4-1) are hard to be spurious thus further support the first hypothesis that married 
people would report higher level of life satisfaction than the non-married even at the time 
of economic crisis. The final models (Model 4-1 and 4-2) also provide the known 
significance and direction of covariates as expected: Females, the employed, the highly 
educated or those in good health tend to report higher level of life satisfaction than those 
who are in the opposite situation.     
 Next, building on Model 4, the MMC is estimated to test the second hypothesis on 
                                           
70 Among the demographic variables, the age variable is particularly important to switching the sign of the 
marital status variable because one’s marital status is positively correlated with age while the relationship 
between age and life satisfaction is U-shaped. 
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the rate of change in the level of life satisfaction by marital status in the period of 
economic recovery (Model 5 in Table 1171): 
 
(Table 11 about here – Results of the MMC) 
 
First, the significance and sign of the main-effect terms, which represent the association 
between life satisfaction and marital status in year 1998, is the same as in Model 4: Even 
after accounting for the differential rate of changes by marital status over time with the 
interaction terms, the relationship between the reported level of life satisfaction and 
marital status stays as expected at the time of severe economic hardships (year 1998). 
What is interesting, however, is the differential rates of changes in the level of life 
satisfaction by marital status represented in the four interaction terms and estimates: 
Although all people, regardless of their marital status, reported significantly higher level 
of life satisfaction as the economy recovered from the economic crisis between 1998 and 
2001, the rate of change of the married is not as steep as the rest of the groups (0.041 for 
the married but 0.101, 0.127, and 0.067 for the separated, divorced, and widowed 
respectively) except for the never married (the reference group, 0.037). However, as can 
be seen in Figure 8, the reported level of life satisfaction in year 2001 is still highest 
among the married even if the rate of recuperation from the economic crisis in terms of 
life satisfaction is faster among the separated and divorced.72  
 
                                           
71 Note that Model 5 builds on Model 4 with the same set of variables plus the interaction terms. 
 
72 The trajectories of the level of life satisfaction by marital status presented in Figure 8 are estimated from 
Model 5, holding the rest of variables in the model at its mean. 
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(Figure 8 about here – Marital Status and Life Satisfaction (1998-2001)) 
 
Therefore, although it would be more conclusive if the post-crisis results could be 
compared to the pre-crisis patterns by marital status73, the second hypothesis of this study 
is also supported in that – probably because of the marriage premium already worked 
protectively at the time of the economic crisis in 1998 – the rate of change in the level of 
life satisfaction over the period of economic recovery for the married is not as fast as that 
of the non-married which could not benefit from marriage premium in the first place.    
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 It is well known that the married tend to report higher level of life satisfaction 
than the non-married, attesting to one of the marriage premium on individual’s 
psychological and emotional well-being. Married couples tend to have more financial 
resources, better physical health, and emotional support from spouse, which in turn 
improves the general level of life satisfaction (Coombs 1991; Dush, Taylor, and Rhiannon 
2008). In this study, I have examined two additional empirical questions regarding the 
association between one’s marital status and life satisfaction in a specific context: 1) if 
married people would still report higher level of life satisfaction than the non-married 
even at the time of severe economic hardships, and 2) how the patterns of change in the 
level of life satisfaction in the following period of economic recovery differ by marital 
                                           
73 The KLIPS began in 1998 right after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, thus no data on pre-crisis South 
Korea. 
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status.  
The results and conclusions drawn from panel data and various statistical 
methods are not much surprising in that married people actually reported higher level of 
life satisfaction than the non-married even at the time of severe economic crisis, such as 
South Korea in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, providing another empirical 
evidence in favor of the marriage premium on subjective personal well-being. However, 
the results of the second part of the empirical analysis – the rate of change in the level of 
life satisfaction during the period of economic recovery differed by marital status – have 
substantial implications less known in the existing literature: Because married people 
already enjoy the marriage premium on life satisfaction at the time of economic hardships 
– or the loss in the level of life satisfaction is smaller than the rest of groups – the rate of 
recuperation from the loss is also smaller among the married than the non-married (e.g. 
the separated and divorced) who potentially suffer most at the time of economic crisis 
and recuperate just as much in the following period of economic recovery. Based on these 
theoretical and empirical observations, therefore, it seems safe to argue that the marriage 
premium on the level of life satisfaction remains valid even in the period of substantial 
economic hardships as well as during regular times.  
Nevertheless, because the observed post-crisis patterns by marital status were not 
able to be compared to the unobserved pre-crisis patterns due to the lack of data in this 
study, the empirical observations and interpretations advanced here remain somewhat 
tentative to be further tested with different datasets and contexts. Furthermore, it is also 
necessary to further investigate the potential mechanisms that would actually explain the 
observed differential patterns by marital status in detail: Although I argue that it is the 
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well-known marriage premium that also works favorably for married people even in the 
context specified for this study, the concept, marriage premium, is rather ambiguous and 
potentially imply multiple unknown dimensions of human psychology, physiology, and 
sociology. If the mechanisms between one’s marital status and the patterns of life 
satisfaction over time could be further explicated in follow-up studies, therefore, the 
descriptions, observations, and arguments advanced in this study are to be more enhanced 
accordingly. 
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Chapter 5 
         Conclusion: For a Sustainable Socioeconomic Development in the Twenty-First 
Century 
 
 
 Over the last three decades, the world has witnessed another fundamental 
institutional shift in the history of capitalist development. In the wake of the series of 
economic crises in the 1970s, the so-called neoliberalism and socioeconomic 
restructuring based on its tenets arose as a solution to the problems of stagflation at the 
time and quickly spread across the globe for following decades thanks to its ideational 
and practical appeals. South Korea has not been an exception to the worldwide current of 
the neoliberal globalization and pursued the neoliberal restructuring since the early 1980s, 
but particularly actively after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As a consequence of the 
comprehensive neoliberal structural adjustment based on free-market mechanisms, 
however, South Korea has also experienced a substantial increase in inequality, poverty, 
and insecurity over the last decade or so.  
Against this context of rising inequality and polarization, I have examined the 
changing contours of various aspects of personal well-being in post-crisis South Korea in 
order to seek the implications of the post-crisis neoliberal restructuring for the general 
welfare of the Korean society in particular, and other neoliberal countries in general. 
Drawing on the decadal experience of South Korea after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
 100 
 
not only were the trajectories of the primary measures of material well-being (i.e. 
earnings and consumption) investigated over the period, but a subject measure of 
personal well-being such as one’s reported level of life satisfaction was also studied as a 
complement to the economic aspects of personal welfare.  
In particular, in the first substantive chapter of this dissertation research, the 
association between education and rising earnings inequality in post-crisis South Korea 
was examined to measure how much of the increase in the post-crisis earnings inequality 
is due to diverging earnings returns to education. With the statistical results from the 
Theil index decomposition, I have documented that over 80% of the increase in the post-
crisis earnings inequality is due to the increase in the within-education-group inequalities 
and argued that in order to properly understand the dynamics of earnings inequality in 
post-crisis South Korea, we need to account for various institutional factors that have 
changed along with the intensification of the neoliberal reforms over the last decade or so, 
by which the degree of the association between education and earnings inequality is 
determined. 
In the following empirical chapter, the relationship between family wealth and 
household consumption was examined over the course of economic crisis and recovery in 
post-crisis South Korea. The primary goal of the investigation was to see if possession of 
family wealth has a buffering effect on household consumption over economic crisis, and 
I have confirmed that the possession of liquid financial assets indeed has the buffer effect 
on the level of household consumption over the period of economic crisis and this 
provides another empirical evidence of the “consumption potential” of family wealth 
realized when indeed in need.  
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 In the last substantive chapter, I explored the association between marital status 
and the level of life satisfaction at the time of economic crisis as well as during the 
subsequent period of economic recovery, utilizing the experience of South Korea in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis once again. By examining the subjective aspect 
of personal well-being in relation to marital status in post-crisis South Korea, I not only 
aimed to evaluate if the “marriage premium” still holds positive on married people’s life 
satisfaction even at the time of severe economic hardships but also investigate if the rate 
of change in the level of life satisfaction over the period of economic recovery differ by 
marital status. The results and conclusions drawn from panel data and various statistical 
methods show that married people actually reported higher level of life satisfaction than 
the non-married even at the time of severe economic crisis, such as South Korea in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, but the rate of change in the level of life 
satisfaction for the married over the next four years of economic recovery was not as 
steep as the non-married, potentially because of the marriage premium that the married 
people already enjoyed at the time of the economic crisis. 
 Now it is clear that South Korea has successfully transformed itself from the 
former dirigiste developmental state to the neoliberal state particularly after the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis and the inevitable social consequences of the on-going 
institutional shift have been a substantial rise in inequality, poverty, and insecurity, which 
interact with various aspects of personal well-being examined in this study.  If so, what 
are the implications of the intensive institutional changes that South Korea has 
experienced over the last decade or so for Koreans living today? Furthermore, given that 
increasing economic inequality is highly likely to be translated into inequalities in other 
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dimensions of social life within and across generations (e.g. inequalities in political 
power), what are the lessons that we can derive from the decades-long experiences of the 
neoliberal reforms and increasing inequality observed across the globe? Moreover, why 
do we have to care about increasing inequality and polarization at all; and if so, what can 
we do to contain them? In the following concluding section, I summarize discussions and 
findings over this series of issues from the existing literature in search of a more viable 
form of capitalist development in the twenty-first century than the current mode of 
neoliberal globalization.  
 
Toward a Sustainable Socioeconomic Development in the Twenty-First Century 
 
In retrospect, the severe economic crisis and the subsequent socioeconomic 
restructuring that South Korea had to endure at the end of the twentieth century may 
seem a blessing in disguise – thanks to the wholesale reforms on the economy and 
institutions implemented upon the 1997 crisis, the deep-seated structural problems from 
the previous developmental regime were clearly exposed and somewhat effectively 
addressed in a relatively short period of time. As a result of the opportune combination of 
the local and global marketization agents greatly aided by the crisis exigencies, South 
Korea has successfully transformed itself from the old dirigiste developmental state to the 
neoliberal state, and the government, financial, corporate, and labor sectors of the Korean 
society have been fully exposed to free-market disciplines in order to secure and enhance 
South Korea as a site for further capitalist accumulation in the era of global economy. 
Although the immediate impact of the crisis on the Korean economy and society at the 
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moment was as disastrous as that of the Great Depression in the 1930s, South Korea 
quickly rebounded from the crisis as early as 1999 and has continuously registered stable 
growth rates and low unemployment rates ever since. As of 2011 – primarily due to the 
successful socioeconomic reforms for the last decade or so – South Korea still stands 
high and robust in the world as one of the fifteen largest economies and a member 
country of G20.74 
Given all the positive macroeconomic performances and success stories wrought 
by the neoliberal reform in post-crisis South Korea, one may indeed argue that the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis and the subsequent ‘opportunities’ for the Korean economy to tune 
into the new global economic standards were a blessing in disguise. Although none of the 
economic indicators under the new developmental regime after the crisis is 
commensurate with those of the pre-crisis period under the dirigiste economy, the set of 
‘creative destruction’ that occurred in the wake of the 1997 crisis surely presented South 
Korea with another opportunity for further economic development and a chance to ride 
the tide of the contemporary neoliberal capitalist accumulation. However, depending on 
how the concept of development is defined, the economic development that South Korea 
has maintained under the new political economy since the crisis has not been an equal 
blessing for all. If we further look into the positive economic indicators, for instance, 
despite the stable average post-crisis economic growth, the level of inequality and 
poverty has substantially increased, particularly after the crisis, to the unprecedented 
level; while the unemployment rate has been maintained below 5% since 1999, which is 
low enough to be considered full employment, over 90 percent of all new jobs created 
                                           
74 The G20 stands for the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors established in 
1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key 
issues in the global economy. See www.g20.org for further details.   
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between 1998 and 2002 after the crisis were non-permanent (IMF 2004). In other words, 
it was a truly blessing for those at the top of the socioeconomic strata who have 
disproportionately benefitted from the post-crisis economic growth while from the view 
point of those at the bottom of the distribution, the observed economic growth since the 
1997 crisis seems far-fetched to be real. 
That the rising economic tide of post-crisis South Korea did not lift all boats but 
the select few may appear perplexing to those who know that pre-crisis South Korea 
under the old developmental state regime was known for its rapid economic growth with 
relatively equal income distribution. Despite the severely underdeveloped welfare system 
under the pre-crisis developmental regime, South Korea managed to maintain a low level 
of income inequality in the midst of the rapid industrialization, and it was natural for 
many Koreans at the time to equate economic growth with bigger pies for all to take their 
fair shares. Accordingly, it seems strange to them that the dynamics of the virtuous circle 
of economic growth and improving welfare for all seem to have abruptly changed in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and not many of them are willing to believe that 
the continuously increasing inequality in spite of the stable economic growth for the last 
decade or so is solely attributable to the economic crisis per se.  
What has happened after the crisis? What are the causes that altered the positive 
association between economic growth and equality before the crisis? As many people 
argue, is it due to the increasing presence of free market forces and globalization after the 
crisis? If so, why does economic growth under the new developmental regime have to be 
associated with increasing inequality unlike the past? If not, what factors other than free-
market accounts could explain the observed discontinuity between pre- and post-crisis 
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South Korea? 
If we look around the world for potential answers to the questions, the seemingly 
perplexing relationship between economic growth and inequality observed in post-crisis 
South Korea is not that enigmatic at all: All countries that implemented the so-called 
neoliberal reforms before South Korea have observed an equally massive increase in 
income inequality and polarization regardless of their macroeconomic performance (e.g. 
the U.S. and the U.K. since 1980s). In effect, the increase in inequality, poverty, and 
insecurity has actually been an integral part of the neoliberal economic regime, being the 
norm rather than the exception: Although the rationale behind the adoption of the new 
dominant political economy somewhat varies by countries, the institutional changes that 
accompanied the neoliberal reform (e.g. deregulation from the state, privatization of the 
public enterprise, and liberalization of the trade) have equally affected the dynamics of 
economic growth and inequality across the countries in the same direction, leading into 
increasing inequality and insecurity (Bourdieu 1998; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; 
Duménil and Lévy 2004a; Harvey 2005; Martin and Schumann 1997; Saad-Filho and 
Johnston 2005; Steger and Roy 2010). In this sense, it ought not be too surprising that the 
post-crisis economic growth in South Korea has not been translated into equal economic 
gains across social strata. As the institutional/structural environments that govern growth 
and inequality have been drastically changed for the neoliberal developmental regime 
since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, so have the living conditions and well-being of the 
people within the changing institutions, leaving substantial portion of the Korean 
population behind the curtain of the new stage of the economic development. In other 
words, what has changed the dynamics between growth and inequality is neither the 
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neutral market forces nor globalization – which have been constant throughout the history 
of capitalist development – but the institutional/structural changes that have allowed the 
disproportionate economic gains of the upper socioeconomic strata at the expense of the 
bottom. 
Then the next provocative but legitimate set of questions: Why do we have to 
care about increasing inequality when the economy as a whole grows anyway? Aren’t 
people just getting their fair share in the capitalist economy according to their work and 
effort, and this logic of market justice is only to be enhanced under the new liberal 
economy created by the neoliberal reforms? Moreover, wouldn’t market function best 
when not interrupted by the state regulations, so we need to purse even freer market for 
more efficient allocation of the limited goods and resources? The responses to these 
questions would ultimately become ideological and political rather than purely economic, 
but it is necessary to examine each claim on the basis of empirical evidences in order to 
move forward, particularly when the world is going through another critical phase of 
capitalist development after the recent 2008 global financial crisis.   
First of all, the reason why we need to care about increasing inequality is that 
there exist individuals who disproportionately suffer from increasing inequality under the 
current neoliberal developmental regime. As clearly shown in the experience of the U.S. 
and the U.K. since the 1980s and South Korea after the 1997 crisis, it is an indisputable 
empirical fact that the level of income at the bottom of the distribution has been stagnant 
at best while those at the top of the distribution have observed substantial income growth 
over the period of the neoliberal restructuring (Duménil and Lévy 2004b; Morris and 
Western 1999; Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty and Saez 2006; Smeeding 2005). In 
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addition, both the quality and quantity of employment conditions for those at the bottom 
of the socioeconomic strata have been deteriorating, and the disproportionate impact of 
the changing employment conditions, in general, negatively interacts with the worsening 
income prospect on their welfare. The employment decline hit individuals and 
households at the low end of the income distribution harder than those at the high end, 
and this accounts for the bulk of the increase in market inequality in industrialized 
countries (Kenworthy 2004) . Furthermore, as the income distribution and employment 
conditions worsen for those at the bottom of the distribution, both absolute and relative 
poverty rates substantially increase. Although it is possible to observe both increasing 
inequality and improving welfare for all social groups in theory, what has been 
empirically observed in reality across the countries is the stagnant or deteriorating 
material conditions for the bottom and the runaway increase at the top (Atkinson 2003; 
Blau and Kahn 2002; Piketty and Saez 2003).  
Second, the changing material conditions for individuals stated above also hold 
substantial implications for the broader economy and society as a whole. As opposed to 
the claims made by the proponents of neoliberalism, increasing inequality does not 
facilitate but hinder economic growth (Stiglitz 2000). For instance, increasing inequality 
among individuals holds down the relative purchasing power of the lower-income strata 
and weakens aggregate consumption, which in turn lowers the expected profits on new 
investment. As the consumption base and the prospect for profits and new investment 
degenerate, the entire economy is likely to slow down unless some counteractive 
measures are implemented. Since the economic recession differentially affects the 
welfare of workers as shown above, the vicious circle that begins with increasing 
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inequality is to further worsen the distribution of goods and services through its adverse 
impact on the prospect of economic growth. Although many economists argue that there 
is a tradeoff between growth and equity, what we know from various empirical evidences 
is that overall inequality is, if anything, harmful to growth, and countries actually can 
increase their incomes with relatively little change in inequality (Furman and Stiglitz 
1999). Furthermore, the adverse impact of increasing inequality is not limited to the 
economic sphere: The worsening distribution of income and wealth is also highly 
associated with negative social and political consequences. Numerous sociological 
studies on inequality have consistently found that income inequality, low income, and a 
large share of the population living in poverty all lead to greater social and political 
instability, including increasing disparities in wealth, education, health, and civil/political 
participations (Coburn 2000; Neckerman and Torche 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). 
Moreover, since the observed trend of increasing inequality and insecurity is more of a 
permanent/structural rather than transitory feature of the current mode of capitalist 
accumulation, it is highly likely that deteriorating living standards for current generations 
due to increasing inequality entail shrinking life-time opportunities and socioeconomic 
mobility for generations to come. With the intra-generational socioeconomic gaps 
translated into the inter-generational inequality, the trend of increasing inequality and its 
adverse impacts is more likely to be entrenched in society, and this would in turn have 
detrimental effects on almost any aspect of the socioeconomic well-being of individuals 
as well as the society as a whole, destroying social fabrics and promoting social divisions. 
Given that increasing inequality is highly likely to perpetuate the conditions of inequality 
across economic, social, and political domains, therefore, it is critical to address the 
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problems of increasing inequality if we care about its consequences for human well-being 
and its broader consequences for the nature of society.  
Lastly, as opposed to the claims made by those who believe in the supremacy of 
markets in the distribution of goods and services, the market forces that govern inequality, 
growth, and the well-being of individuals and the society, are neither natural nor neutral. 
As many prominent scholars having worked on the nature of markets and capitalism 
argue, there is no such a thing as a free market (Blyth 2002; Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Krugman 2009a; Polanyi [1944] 2001). Markets are fundamentally embedded in a 
particular set of laws and institutions at the particular historical juncture of time and 
space, thus the parameters of the ‘free’ markets are essentially delineated by the 
collective decisions of people, not by the invisible hand of markets. Accordingly, the 
distributions of goods and services generated by the market supply and demand are also 
governed by the social and political institutions, and the resultant inequality in this 
respect is also a socio-political product of the collective institutional designs rather than 
of the natural market forces (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Fischer, Hout, Jankowski, 
Lucas, Swidler, and Voss 1996; Granovetter 1985; Levy and Temin 2007). In the similar 
vein, markets would not function best when not regulated by the state: As the proponents 
of market fundamentalist also agree, the role of state in the creation of the environments 
conducive to market transactions is more than essential, and it is impossible to expect a 
functioning market without the functional state (Frieden 2006; Stiglitz 2003). Given the 
embeddedness of markets in institutions and the critical role played by the state, therefore, 
it is not realistic to assume that workers are getting their fair share solely due to their 
work and effort even in the free-market capitalist economy, but more practically, the 
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various socioeconomic problems that we have observed over the last three decades are 
only to be worsened in the future if the logic of ‘market justice’ is to be further enhanced 
under the current neoliberal political economy.  
If it is clear that increasing economic inequality and insecurity under the current 
mode of neoliberal capitalist globalization is bad for individuals as well as for the broader 
economy and society, and if it is not absolutely necessary to compromise between growth 
and inequality, what can we do to effectively address the problems at the same time as 
devising a new economic system in which a more sustainable form of capitalist 
development is feasible? First of all, it is important to realize that the problems of 
increasing inequality, insecurity, and poverty that we have observed for the last three 
decades is neither a natural nor transitory phenomenon, but a structural one integral to 
the current mode of capitalist development. As I have consistently argued throughout this 
thesis, it is the series of the institutional/policy changes based on neoliberalism that have 
increased the level of income inequality and economic insecurity across the countries that 
have adopted the neoliberal reform for further capitalist accumulation. Given that one of 
the critical dimensions of the neoliberalism is individualization of social/structural 
problems – which emphasizes individual’s free choice as well as individualized 
responsibility for all the outcomes of the free choice – it is crucial not to forget that the 
observed consequences of the neoliberal restructuring are as much structural as individual 
at the least. 
Next, once we realize that the problems associated with the neoliberal 
restructuring is structural, we ought to think about potential solutions to the problems at 
the structural level as well since structural problems require structural solutions. In other 
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words, because the increasing income inequality and economic insecurity are the results 
of the policy/institutional changes premised on neoliberal principals, it should also be 
possible to fix the problems with a counteractive set of changes in policy and institutions 
that promote equality over inequality and safety nets over insecurity. Then what are the 
policies and institutions with which we can achieve this goal? At the technical level, the 
answers are simple: Since the increasing inequality under the current model of capitalist 
regime is primarily due to the sky-rocketing upper-class income, stagnant or decreasing 
middle-class income, and decreasing lower-class income, we can implement both ex-ante 
and ex-post policy measures that would 1) restrain the runaway income at the top of the 
distribution (e.g. tax policy and norms) and 2) boosts income at the bottom of the 
distribution (e.g. minimum wage, unionization, and social/welfare transfers). In addition 
to these measures for improving equality of outcome, the government can also take a 
more proactive role to improve equality of opportunity by investing in education, health, 
housing, and child development. What is more difficult, however, is to change the current 
conservative political climate in which generating the political will to support and 
implement those liberal/progressive socioeconomic policies are not easy. For several 
decades after Hayek (1994), the proponents of free-market capitalism have consistently – 
and somewhat convincingly – argued that unfettered free-market forces are the best 
mechanisms for efficient allocations of limited goods and services, and this rather 
theoretical assertion has resonated well with economic and political elites up to the recent 
global financial crisis in 2008. Under these circumstances, can we possibly lessen the 
momentum of neoliberalism while creating a new momentum for more sustainable form 
of socioeconomic development? 
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Yes, we can. As of 2011, the momentum of the neoliberal globalization has been 
somewhat halted by the recent global financial crisis in 2008. The countries that have 
adopted the neoliberal reforms have begun to realize the problematic nature of the 
neoliberal capitalist development, and the leading economies have been working hard 
together to solve the problems of inequality and insecurity innate to the current mode of 
neoliberal globalization, realizing that they are the critical sources of current economic 
crisis not the inevitable consequences of the natural market forces for growth (Rajan 
2010). As always has been the case in the history of capitalist development since its 
inception, a major economic crisis presents both risks and opportunities for creative 
destruction, and depending on how we capitalize on the window of opportunity created 
by the current global economic crisis, the next phase of capitalist development could be a 
more economically viable and socially sustainable form than the current mode of 
neoliberal development. In the same vein, the managers of South Korea should also 
realize that the most acute socioeconomic problem that South Korea as a whole has to 
address at this moment is the problems of increasing inequality and widening gaps across 
socioeconomic strata. The gaps and inequalities in material conditions would inevitably 
lead to inequalities in other socio-political dimensions, and the inequalities observed in 
current generations will definitely be translated into further inequalities for generations to 
come. If South Korea aims to continue to write the success stories that it has written for 
the last several decades, therefore, not only do they have to keep the best part of market 
dynamics – as they have already worked hard enough after the 1997 AFC – but also make 
extra efforts to mend the weakest links of the capitalist development (i.e. systemic 
inequality and instability) through progressive policies and institutional changes. Once 
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again, markets, capitalism, and inequality are all the creatures that we have collectively 
designed according to our needs and desires. If our needs and desires are not satiated with 
– or even threatened by – the current social, economic, and political systems, we have a 
natural right and will to change accordingly. 
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Table 1. Indicators of Market Openness of South Korea (1990-2008) 
 
Year 
Direct 
Investment in 
Korea (Bill. $) 
Direct 
Investment 
Abroad (Bill. $) 
Imports 
(Bill. $) 
Exports 
(Bill. $) 
Foreign Stock 
Ownership 
(%) 
1990 0.80  1.07  69.84  65.02  - 
1991 1.40  1.31  81.52  71.87  - 
1992 0.89  1.35  81.78  76.63  - 
1993 1.04  1.45  83.80  82.24  - 
1994 1.32  2.37  102.35  96.01  - 
1995 1.97  3.21  135.12  125.06  - 
1996 3.21  4.50  150.34  129.72  12.97 
1997 6.97  3.78  144.62  136.16  14.59 
1998 8.86  4.76  93.28  132.31  18.6 
1999 15.54  3.35  119.75  143.69  21.91 
2000 15.26  5.18  160.48  172.27  26.98  
2001 11.29  5.25  141.10  150.44  32.17  
2002 9.10  3.96  152.13  162.47  32.79  
2003 6.47  4.66  178.83  193.82  37.67  
2004 12.80  6.39  224.46  253.84  40.10  
2005 11.57  6.95  261.24  284.42  37.17  
2006 11.25  11.48  309.38  325.46  35.16  
2007 10.51  21.09  356.85  371.49  30.94  
2008 11.71  21.63  435.27  422.01  27.25  
Sources: Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/); Korea Exchange (http://eng.krx.co.kr/index.html/) 
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Table 2. Principle Economic Indicators of South Korea (1990-2008) 
 
Year 
  Real GDP            
(annual % 
change) 
  GNI per 
capita 
Stock price 
index (annual 
average) 
Exchange rate 
(won/$) 
  
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
1990 9.2 6,147  746 716.7 2.4 
1991 9.4 7,105  658 759.5 2.4 
1992 5.9 7,527  585.7 786.9 2.5 
1993 6.1 8,177  728.4 807.2 2.9 
1994 8.5 9,459  965.3 788.5 2.5 
1995 9.2 11,432  934.9 775.7 2.1 
1996 7.0 12,197  833.4 844.9 2.0 
1997 4.7 11,176  654.5 1,695.00 2.6 
1998 -6.9 7,355  406.07 1,204.00 7.0 
1999 9.5 9,438  806.8 1,138.00 6.3 
2000 8.5 11,292  734.22 1,264.50 4.1 
2001 4.0 10,631  572.8 1,313.50 3.8 
2002 7.2 12,100  757 1,186.20 3.1 
2003 2.8 13,460  679.8 1,192.60 3.4 
2004 4.6 15,082  832.9 1,035.10 3.5 
2005 4.0 17,531  1,073.60 1,011.60 3.5 
2006 5.2 19,722  1,352.22 929.8 3.3 
2007 5.1 21,695  1,712.46 936.1 3.0 
2008 2.2 19,231  1,529.49 1,259.50 3.0 
Source: Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/) 
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Table 3. Variables and Descriptive Statistics by Year (1997-2006)  
 
  
Average monthly earnings 
(in 10,000 Korean Won)  Education (%)  Sample 
Size 
Year   Mean SD   High- 2-3yr 4yr+   
1997  117.48 67.33  66.08 8.01 25.91  3,370 
1998  109.26 64.20  68.35 7.65 24.00  3,188 
1999  116.13 65.51  69.67 7.68 22.65  2,892 
2000  128.94 82.33  69.15 7.96 22.89  2,840 
2001  140.13 85.96  69.80 7.71 22.50  2,907 
2002  154.61 98.62  67.64 8.05 24.31  2,933 
2003  169.37 111.63  67.06 7.80 25.14  2,872 
2004  177.47 116.88  66.19 8.81 25.01  2,703 
2005  188.96 149.52  66.84 8.84 24.32  2,738 
2006   200.94 214.55   66.74 8.67 24.59   2,712 
Total   148.71 116.66   67.75 8.10 24.15   29,155 
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Table 4. Theil Index Decomposition by Education (1997-2006) 
 
Year Total Within Between 
1997 0.151 0.121 0.030 
1998 0.159 0.127 0.032 
1999 0.148 0.120 0.029 
2000 0.167 0.131 0.036 
2001 0.169 0.135 0.035 
2002 0.183 0.139 0.043 
2003 0.195 0.142 0.052 
2004 0.196 0.144 0.052 
2005 0.228 0.171 0.057 
2006 0.280 0.226 0.054 
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Table 5. Within-Group Inequality Trends by Education (1997-2006) 
 
Year  High school & below 
2 to 3 year   
college 
University & 
above 
1997 0.135 0.097 0.106 
1998 0.140 0.085 0.115 
1999 0.135 0.086 0.102 
2000 0.146 0.081 0.119 
2001 0.153 0.094 0.114 
2002 0.168 0.098 0.107 
2003 0.165 0.104 0.121 
2004 0.173 0.106 0.117 
2005 0.197 0.118 0.152 
2006 0.284 0.128 0.175 
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Table 6. Change in Income and Consumption in 1998 
 
 Status Income Consumption 
Increased 1.36 6.37 
Same 24.66 37.07 
Decreased 73.98 56.56 
Total 100 100 
Note: 4991 households surveyed in 1998 (KLIPS) 
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Table 7. Variables and Descriptive Statistics by Year (1997-2006; Continued on the next page) 
 
Variables 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Logged household average 
monthly expenses      
Mean 4.382  4.513  4.564  4.650  4.805  
SD 0.719  0.575  0.608  0.588  0.595  
      
Possession of Liquid 
Financial Assets (%) 17.4  23.6  16.5  15.7  18.1  
      
Total Household Income 
(in 100,000 Korean Won)      
Mean 13.103  14.999  16.220  17.569  20.601  
SD 11.442  10.728  11.732  13.656  15.519  
Number of Household 
Members      
Mean 3.495  3.671  3.630  3.586  3.528  
SD 1.360  1.280  1.277  1.272  1.255  
      
Home Ownership (%) 55.9  57.5  56.2  57.6  58.4  
      
Average Monthly Savings 
(in 100,000 Korean Won)      
Mean 3.328  2.771  3.204  3.847  4.645  
SD 5.637  4.229  5.328  5.745  6.255  
      
Possession of Financial 
Debt (%) 41.8  38.5  36.7  40.4  41.1  
      
Sample size (household-
year observations) 4,865 3,835 3,653 3,555 3,700 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Logged household average 
monthly expenses       
Mean 5.014  5.112  5.139  5.170  5.244  4.823  
SD 0.535  0.514  0.519  0.535  0.532  0.660  
       
Possession of Liquid 
Financial Assets (%) 20.4  19.0  23.5  28.9  30.4  21.1  
       
Total Household Income 
(in 100,000 Korean Won)       
Mean 25.120  27.447  28.089  29.200  30.723  21.578  
SD 16.679  19.530  20.188  20.722  20.279  17.315  
Number of Household 
Members       
Mean 3.587  3.523  3.458  3.403  3.351  3.525  
SD 1.189  1.169  1.198  1.215  1.211  1.255  
       
Home Ownership (%) 61.4  61.6  61.8  61.4  60.7  59.0  
       
Average Monthly Savings 
(in 100,000 Korean Won)       
Mean 6.356  6.732  6.490  6.680  7.512  4.972  
SD 7.786  10.372  7.076  7.742  12.675  7.677  
       
Possession of Financial 
Debt (%) 44.3  45.0  43.6  47.3  47.2  42.4  
       
Sample size (household-
year observations) 2,860 2,972 3,163 3,282 3,358 35,243 
       
 
 
 
 123 
 
Table 8. Results of the Multilevel Models for Change in Household Monthly Living Expenses (1997-2006) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept (Year 97) 4.3244 *** 4.313 *** 3.5828 *** 3.4691 *** 
 
(0.0088) 
 
(0.0088) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.0125) 
 Linear spline of year  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1997-2001 0.1036 *** 0.1041 *** 0.0868 *** 0.1161 *** 
 
(0.0021) 
 
(0.0021) 
 
(0.0019) 
 
(0.003) 
 2001-2006 0.0894 *** 0.0877 *** 0.0680 *** 0.0803 *** 
 
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0026) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 Possession of liquid financial assets 
 
0.0619 *** 0.0590 *** 0.0791 *** 
   
(0.0053) 
 
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0114) 
 Total hh income 
    
0.0116 *** 0.0257 *** 
     
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0005) 
 Number of hh members 
    
0.1649 *** 0.1610 *** 
   
 
 
(0.0026) 
 
(0.0026) 
 Home ownership 
    
0.0609 *** 0.0629 *** 
   
 
 
(0.0058) 
 
(0.0057) 
 Savings 
    
-0.0001 
 
-0.0145 *** 
     
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0011) 
 Financial Debt 
    
0.0114 ** -0.0472 *** 
     
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0095) 
 Liquid assets * Year spline 
        1997-2001 
      
-0.0070 ** 
       
(0.0041) 
 2001-2006 
      
0.0031 
 
       
(0.0031) 
 Total hh income * Year spline 
        1997-2001 
      
0.0037 *** 
       
(0.0002 ) 
 2001-2006 
      
0.0003 *** 
       
(0.0001) 
 Savings * Year spline 
        1997-2001 
      
0.0042 *** 
       
(0.0003) 
 2001-2006 
      
-0.0003 † 
       
(0.0002) 
 Debt * Year spline 
        1997-2001 
      
0.0188 *** 
       
(0.0034) 
 2001-2006 
      
0.0002 
               (0.0027)   
† p≤0.10; * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p≤0.001 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 9. Variables and Descriptive Statistics by Year (1998-2001) 
 
Variables 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Life Satisfaction      
Mean 2.89  2.95  3.06  3.08  2.99  
SD 0.90  0.80  0.67  0.65  0.77  
Marital Status (%)      
Never Married 28.37  27.82  28.50  29.13  28.44  
Married 63.20  62.71  62.45  61.76  62.59  
Separated 0.95  0.65  0.50  0.52  0.67  
Divorced 1.03  1.26  1.21  1.17  1.16  
Widowed 6.46  7.56  7.33  7.41  7.14  
Age      
Mean 39.77  40.71  41.30  41.84  40.84  
SD 16.20  16.60  16.69  16.93  16.60  
Female (%) 51.00  52.00  51.87  51.96  51.79  
Health      
Mean 3.84  3.85  3.80  3.39  3.72  
SD 1.00  1.02  0.96  0.94  1.00  
Education (%)      
High school or below 74.74  75.30  75.20  73.23  74.59  
Junior college 7.56  7.26  7.57  8.22  7.65  
University or above 17.70  17.44  17.24  18.55  17.75  
      
Nonemployed (%) 52.00  47.63  48.03  47.48  48.81  
      
Household income/month             
(in 100,000 Korean Won)      
Mean 14.91  16.33  17.46  20.99  17.31  
SD 11.93  13.56  15.71  18.47  15.15  
Marriage length      
Mean 15.76  16.69  16.62  16.65  16.40  
SD 16.34  16.90  17.02  17.32  16.88  
Sample (person-year obs.) 11265  9732  8999  9577  39573  
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Table 10. Results of the Multiple Linear Regression Model and Cumulative Logit Model for Year 1998 
 
  Multiple Linear Regression  Cumulative Logit   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4-1   Model 4-2 
Marital Status            Married -0.132 *** 0.216 *** 0.215 *** 0.203 ***  0.450 
*** 
 (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032)   (0.072)  Separated -0.689 *** -0.263 ** -0.158 * -0.173   -0.306  
 (0.089)  (0.093)  (0.089)  (0.089)   (0.192)  Divorced -0.769 *** -0.329 *** -0.213 ** -0.228 **  -0.463 
** 
 (0.086)  (0.089)  (0.086)  (0.086)   (0.187)  Widowed -0.395 *** 0.053  0.062  0.065   0.157  
 (0.037)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.051)   (0.112)  Age 
(centered at 40)   -0.009 
*** -0.008 *** -0.011 ***  -0.023 
*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.005)  
Age2   0.0004 
*** 0.0005 *** 0.0006 ***  0.0013 
*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.001)  Female   -0.010  0.027  0.023   0.051  
   (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)   (0.041)  Health   0.161 
*** 0.127 *** 0.127 ***  0.283 
*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)   (0.021)  Education            Junior College     0.122 
*** 0.137 ***  0.299 
*** 
     (0.031)  (0.032)   (0.071)  Univ. or above     0.229 
*** 0.243 ***  0.519 
*** 
     (0.023)  (0.024)   (0.053)  Nonemployed     -0.068 
*** -0.075 ***  -0.149 
*** 
     (0.019)  (0.019)   (0.042)  Household 
income     0.001 
*** 0.001 ***  0.003 
*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  Marriage Length       0.008 
** 
 0.018 
** 
       (0.003)   (0.007)  
Marriage 
Length2       -0.0001 
* 
 -0.0003 
* 
       (0.000)   (0.000)  Constant 3.016 *** 2.042 *** 1.935 *** 1.866 ***      (0.016)  (0.049)  (0.054)  (0.061)     
Sample Size 11265   11265   
* p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p≤0.001 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 11. Results of the Multilevel Model for Change in the Level of Life Satisfaction (1998-2001) 
 
  Model 5  
Year (1998-2001) 0.037 ***  
 
(0.006) 
 
 
Marital status  
 
 
Married 0.169 ***  
 (0.022) 
 
 
Separated -0.239 ***  
 (0.072) 
 
 
Divorced -0.303 ***  
 (0.069) 
 
 
Widowed 0.008 
 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
 
(abridged)  
Marital status * Year    
Married 0.041 ***  
 (0.007) 
 
 
Separated 0.101 ***  
 (0.037) 
 
 
Divorced 0.127 ***  
 (0.029) 
 
 
Widowed 0.067 ***  
  (0.013)    
(abridged)  
* p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p≤0.001 (two-tailed test) 
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Figure 1. Trends in Income Inequality of South Korea (1990-2008) 
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Figure 2. Relative and Absolute Poverty Rates of South Korea (1990-2008) 
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Figure 3. Earnings Trends by Education (1990-2008; KOSIS) 
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Figure 4. Earnings Trends by Education (1997-2006; KLIPS) 
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Figure 5. Theil Index Decomposition by Education (1997-2006) 
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Figure 6. Within-Group Inequality Trends by Education (1997-2006; Theil Index) 
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Figure 7. Macroeconomic Performance of South Korea (1990-2008) 
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Figure 8. Marital Status and Life Satisfaction (1998-2001; Estimated) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
1998 1999 2000 2001
Re
po
rt
ed
 Le
ve
 o
f L
ife
 S
at
isf
ac
tio
n 
Year 
Married
Widowed
Never Married
Separated
Divorced
 136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
  
 137 
 
Agresti, Alan. 2002. Categorical Data Analysis. New York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. 
 
Allison, Paul D. 1978. "Measures of Inequality." American Sociological Review 43:865-
880. 
 
Amsden, Alice H. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Alan B. Kreuger. 1991. "Does Compulsory School Attendance 
Affect Schooling and Earnings?" The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:979-
1014. 
 
Asian Development Bank. 1999a. Interpreting the Asian Financial Crisis. Manila, 
Philippines: Asian Development Bank. 
 
Asian Development Bank. 1999b. Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis: An 
Overview of the Debate and the Next Steps. Manila, Philippines: Asian 
Development Bank. 
 
Atkinson, Anthony B. 2003. "Income and Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and 
Explanation." CESifo Economic Studies 49:479-513. 
 
Becker, Gary S. 1993. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with 
Special Reference to Education. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Beeson, Mark and Iyanatul Islam. 2005. "Neo-liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the 
Washington Consensus." The Journal of Development Studies 41:197-219. 
 
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2002. At Home and Abroad: U.S. Labor-
Market Performance in International Perspective. New York, NY: Russel Sage 
Foundation. 
 
Blundell, Richard, Lorraine Dearden, Alissa Goodman, and Howard Reed. 2000. "The 
Returns to Higher Education in Briatain: Evidence from a British Cohort." THe 
Economic Journal 110:82-99. 
 
Blyth, Mark. 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in 
the Twentieth Century. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. "Neoliberalism, the Utopia (Becoming a Reality) of Unlimited 
Exploitation." Pp. 94-105 in Acts of Resistance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press and 
the New Press. 
 
Campbell, John L. and Ove Kaj Pedersen. 2001. "The Rise of Neoliberalism and 
Institutional Analysis." Pp. xv, 288 p. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
 138 
 
Card, David. 1999. "The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings." Pp. 1801-1863 in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3, edited by O. Ashenfelther and D. Card. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Card, David. 2001. "The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market." 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54:296-315. 
 
Card, David and John E. DiNardo. 2002. "Skill-Biased Technical Change and Rising 
Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles." Journal of Labor Economics 
20:733-783. 
 
Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. 2004. "Unions and Wage 
Inequality." Journal of Labor Research 25:519-562. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 1998. "Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis." World Development 26:1555-
1561. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2006. The East Asian Development Experience: The Miracle, the Crisis 
and the Future. New York, NY: Zed Books. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2008. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History 
of Capitalism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon, Hong-Jae Park, and Chul Gyue Yoo. 1998. "Interpreting the Korean 
Crisis: Financial Liberalisation, Industrial Policy and Corporate Governance." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 22:735-746. 
 
Chomsky, Noam. 1999. Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. New York, 
NY: Seven Stories Press. 
 
Chu, Yun-Peng and Hal Hill. 2001. The Social Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Coburn, David. 2000. "Income Inequality, Social Cohesion and the Health Status of 
Populations: The Role of Neo-liberalism." Social Science & Medicine 51:135-146. 
 
Coombs, Robert H. 1991. "Marital Status and Personal Well-Being: A Literature 
Review." Family Relations 40:97-102. 
 
Cumings, Bruce. 1979. "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political 
Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences." 
International Organization 38:1-40. 
 
Cumings, Bruce. 1999. "The Asian Crisis, Democracy, and the End of "Late" 
Development." Pp. 17-44 in The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, edited by 
T. J. Pempel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 139 
 
 
Danziger, Sheldon, Robert Haveman, and Robert Plotnick. 1981. "How Income Transfer 
Programs Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review." 
Journal of Economic Literature 19:975-1028. 
 
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. "Labor Market 
Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric 
Approach." Econometrica 64:1001-1044. 
 
DiPrete, Thomas A. 2007. "What Has Sociology to Contribute to the Study of Inequality 
Trends? A Historical and Comparative Perspective." The American Behavioral 
Scientist 50:603-618. 
 
Domhoff, G. William. 1990. The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in 
America. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Duménil, Gérard and Dominique Lévy. 2004a. Capital Resurgent: Roots of the 
Neoliberal Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Duménil, Gérard and Dominique Lévy. 2004b. "Neoliberal Income Trends: Wealth, Class 
and Ownership in the USA." New Left Review 30:105-133. 
 
Dush, Claire M. Kamp, Miles G. Taylor, and A. Kroeger Rhiannon. 2008. "Marital 
Happiness and Psychological Well-Being across the Life Course." Family 
Relations 57:211-226. 
 
Emery, Robert F. 2001. Korean Economic Reform: Before and Since the 1997 Crisis. 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Evans, Peter B. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Firebaugh, Glenn. 1999. "Empirics of World Income Inequality." The American Journal 
of Sociology 104:1597-1630. 
 
Firebaugh, Glenn. 2003. The New Geography of Global Income Inequality. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Fischer, Claude S., Michael Hout, Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas, Ann 
Swidler, and Kim Voss. 1996. Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve 
Myth. Princeton, NJ: Princton University Press. 
 
Fitzmaurice, Garrett M., Nan M. Laird, and James H. Ware. 2004. Applied Longitudinal 
Analysis. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience. 
 
 
 140 
 
Fox, John. 2008. Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Limiar Models. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Frieden, Jeffry A. 2006. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. 
New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Furman, Jason and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1999. "Economic Consequences of Income 
Inequality." Federal Reserve Bank Review of Kansas City. 
 
Gelman, Andrew and Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and 
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A 
Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 
Gills, Barry K. 2000. "The Crisis of East Asian Capitalism: American Power, Democracy, 
and the Vicissitudes of Globalization." Review of International Studies 26:381-
403. 
 
Glenn, Norval D. and Charles N. Weaver. 1988. "The Changing Relationship of Marital 
Status to Reported Happiness." Journal of Marriage and the Family 50:317-324. 
 
Goesling, Brian. 2001. "Changing Income Inequalities Within and Between Nations: New 
Evidence." American Sociological Review 66:745-761. 
 
Goodman, Roger, Gordon White, and Huck-Ju Kwon. 1998. The East Asian Welfare 
Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness." American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510. 
 
Gray, Kevin. 2007. Korean Workers and Neoliberal Globalization. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
Hall, Peter A. and David W. Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hart-Landsberg, Martin. 1993. The Rush to Development: Economic Change and 
Political Struggle in South Korea. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Hart-Landsberg, Martin and Paul Burkett. 2001. "Economic Crisis and Restructuring in 
South Korea: Beyond the Free Market-Statist Debate." Critical Asian Studies 
33:403-430. 
 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 141 
 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1994. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Henretta, John C. and Richard T. Campbell. 1978. "Net Worth as an Aspect of Status." 
American Journal of Sociology 83:1204-1223. 
 
Hughes, Helen. 1999. "Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency Financial 'Crises'." 
Policy:3-9. 
 
IMF. 1997. "Republic of Korea IMF Stand-by Arrangement of the Economic Program." 
vol. December 5, 1997. 
 
—. 2004. "Republic of Korea: Selected Issues." IMF, Washington D.C. 
 
Johnson, Chalmers. 1998. "Economic Crisis in East Asia: The Clash of Capitalisms." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 22:653-661. 
 
Johnson, Heather Beth. 2006. The American Dream and the Power of Wealth: Choosing 
Schools and Inheriting Inequality in the Land of Opportunity. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
Katz, Lawrence F. and David H. Autor. 1999. "Changes in the Wage Structure and 
Earnings Inequality." in Handbook of Labor Economics, edited by O. Ashenfelter 
and D. Card. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Keister, Lisa A. 2000. Wealth in America: Trends in Wealth Inequality. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Keister, Lisa A. and Stephanie Moller. 2000. "Wealth Inequality in the United States." 
Annual Review of Sociology 26:63-81. 
 
Kenworthy, Lane. 2004. Egalitarian Capitalism: Jobs, Incomes, and Growth in Affluent 
Countries. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Kenworthy, Lane. 2007. "Inequality and Sociology." The American Behavioral Scientist 
50:584-602. 
 
Kim, Sunhyuk and Doh Chull Shin. 2004. Economic Crisis and Dual Transition in Korea: 
A Case Study in Comparative Perspective. Seoul, Korea: Seoul National 
University Press. 
 
Kolko, Gabriel. 1962. Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and 
Income Distribution. New York, NY: Praeger. 
 
Koo, Hagen. 2001. Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation. Ithaca: 
 142 
 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Korea Labor Institute. 2009. Korean Labor and Income Panel Study User's Guide. Seoul, 
Korea: Korea Labor Institute. 
 
Krugman, Paul R. 2009a. The Conscience of a Liberal. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Krugman, Paul R. 2009b. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. 
New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Kuznets, Simon. 1955. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." The American 
Economic Review 45:1-28. 
 
Lee, David S. 1999. "Wage Inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rising 
Dispersion or Falling Minimum Wage?" The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
114:977-1023. 
 
Lee, Gary R., Karen Seccombe, and Constance L. Shehan. 1991. "Marital Status and 
Personal Happiness: An Analysis of Trend Data." Journal of Marriage and 
Family 53:839-844. 
 
Levy, Frank and Peter Temin. 2007. "Inequality and Insititutions in 20th Century 
America." in MIT Industrial Peformance Center Working Paper Series. 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Lie, John. 1998. Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
 
Lim, Hyun-Chin and Jin-Ho Jang. 2006. "Neo-liberalism in Post-Crisis South Korea: 
Social Conditions and Outcomes." Journal of Contemporary Asia 36:442-463. 
 
Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent 
Variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Martin, Hans-Peter and Harald Schumann. 1997. The Global Trap: Globalization and the 
Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. New York, NY: Zed Books. 
 
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Morris, Martina and Bruce Western. 1999. "Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century." Annual Review of Sociology 25:623-657. 
 
Neckerman, Kathryn M. and Florencia Torche. 2007. "Inequality: Causes and 
Consequences." Annual Review of Sociology 33:335-357. 
 
OECD. 2000a. Economic Survey of Korea. Paris: OECD. 
 143 
 
 
—. 2000b. Regulatory Reform in Korea. Paris, France: OECD. 
 
—. 2007. Korea: Progress in Implementing Regulatory Reform. Paris, France: OECD. 
 
Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas M. Shapiro. 1995. Black Wealth/ White Wealth: A New 
Perspective on Racial Inequality. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Parkin, Frank. 1971. Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in 
Capitalist and Communist Societies. New York, NY: Praeger. 
 
Pempel, T.J. 1999. "Introduction." Pp. 1-14 in The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, 
edited by T. J. Pempel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. "Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913-1988." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:1-39. 
 
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez. 2006. "The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical 
and International Perspective." American Economic Review 96:200-205. 
 
Pirie, Iain. 2008. The Korean Developmental State: From Dirigisme to Neo-liberalism. 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Polanyi, Karl. [1944] 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
 
Pontusson, Jonas, David Rueda, and Christopher R. Way. 2002. "Comparative Political 
Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labor Market 
Institutions." British Journal of Political Science 32:281-308. 
 
Powers, Daniel A. and Yu Xie. 2000. Statistical Methods for Categorical Data Analysis. 
San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 
Prasad, Monica. 2006. The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic 
Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia and Anders Skrondal. 2008. Multilevel and Longitudinal 
Modelling Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram. 2010. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World 
Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Raudenbush, Stephen W. and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. Hierarchical Linear Models: 
Applications and Data Analysis Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
 144 
 
Reardon, Sean F. and Glenn Firebaugh. 2002. "Measures of Multigroup Segregation." 
Sociological Methodology 32:33-67. 
 
Saad-Filho, Alfredo and Deborah Johnston. 2005. "Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader." 
Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Wing Thye Woo. 2000. "Understanding the Asian Financial Crisis." 
Pp. 13-43 in The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient Asia, edited by W. 
T. Woo, J. D. Sachs, and K. Schwab. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Shapiro, Thomas M. 2004. The Hidden Cost of Being African American: How Wealth 
Perpetuates Inequality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sherraden, Michael W. 1991. Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare Policy. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Shin, Jang-Sup and Ha-Joon Chang. 2003. Restructuring Korea Inc. New York, NY: 
RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Shin, Kwang-Yeong. 2011. "Globalization and Social Inequality in South Korea." Pp. viii, 
164 p. in New Millennium South Korea: Neoliberal Capitalism and Transnational 
Movements, edited by J. Song. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Singer, Judith D. and John B. Willett. 2003. Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: 
Modeling Change and Event Occurrence. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Smeeding, Timothy M. 2005. "Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The 
United States in Comparative Perspective." Social Science Quarterly 86:955-983. 
 
Spilerman, Seymour. 2000. "Wealth and Stratification Processes." Annual Review of 
Sociology 26:497-524. 
 
Spilerman, Seymour, Noah Lewin-Epstein, and Moshe Semyonov. 1993. "Wealth, 
Intergenerational Transfers, and Life Chances." in Social Theory and Social 
Policy: Essays in Honor of James S. Coleman, edited by A. B. Sorensen and S. 
Spilerman. New Your, NY: Praeger. 
 
Stack, Steven and J. Ross Eshleman. 1998. "Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation 
Study." Journal of Marriage and Family 60:527-536. 
 
Steger, Manfred B. and Ravi K. Roy. 2010. Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2000. "Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and 
Instability." World Development 28:1075-1086. 
 145 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2003. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Stutzer, Alois and Bruno S. Frey. 2006. "Does Marriage Make People Happy, or Do 
Happy People Get Married?" Journal of Socio-Economics 35:326-347. 
 
Theil, Henri. 1967. Economics and Information Theory. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. 
 
Tsai, Shu-Ling and Yu Xie. 2008. "Changes in Earnings Returns to Higher Education in 
Taiwan since the 1990s." Population Review 47:1-20. 
 
Van Hoa, Tran. 2000. The Social Impact of the Asia Crisis. New York, NY: Palgrave. 
 
Wade, Robert. 1998a. "The Asian Crisis and the Global Economy: Causes, Consequences 
and Cure." Current History 97:361-373. 
 
Wade, Robert. 1998b. "The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997-?: Causes and 
Consequences." World Development 26:1535-1553. 
 
Wade, Robert. 1998c. "From 'Miracle' to 'Cronyism': Explaining the Great Asian Slump." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 22:693-706. 
 
Wade, Robert and Frank Veneroso. 1998. "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model 
Versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex." New Left Review:3-22. 
 
Weber, Max. 1958. "Class, Status, Party." in From Max Weber, edited by H. H. Gerth and 
C. W. Mills. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Western, Bruce and Jake Rosenfeld. 2011. "Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage 
Inequality." American Sociological Review 76:513-537. 
 
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Kate E. Pickett. 2009. "Income Inequality and Social 
Dysfunction." Annual Review of Sociology 35:493-511. 
 
Winters, Jeffrey A. 1999. "The Determinant of Financial Crisis in Asia." Pp. 79-97 in The 
Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, edited by T. J. Pempel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University. 
 
Wolff, Edward N. 2002. Top Heavy: The Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America and 
What Can be Done About It. New York, NY: New Press. 
 
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
Woo, Jung-en. 1991. Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
 146 
 
Woo, Meredith Jung-En. 2007a. "After the Miracle: Neoliberalism and Institutional 
Reform in East Asia." Pp. 1-31 in Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East 
Asia, edited by M. J.-E. Woo. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Woo, Meredith Jung-En. 2007b. "Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia." 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank. 1997. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
You, Jong-Il and Ju-Ho Lee. 2000. "Economic and Social Consequences of Globalization: 
The Case of South Korea." in New School University Center for Economic Policy 
Analysis Working Paper Series I. New York, NY. 
